

# Police Operations and Data Analysis Report

## Casa Grande, Arizona



C E N T E R F O R P U B L I C S A F E T Y M A N A G E M E N T

Submitted by and reply to:  
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# ICMA

*Leaders at the Core of Better Communities*

## **ICMA Background**

The International City/County Management Association (ICMA) is the premier local government leadership and management professional association. Since 1914, ICMA's mission has been to create excellence in local governance by developing and advocating professional local government management worldwide. ICMA provides an information clearinghouse, technical assistance, training, and professional development to more than 9,100 city, town, and county experts and other individuals throughout the world.

## **ICMA Consulting Services**

The ICMA Center for Public Safety Management team helps communities solve critical problems by providing management consulting support to local governments. One of ICMA Consulting Services' areas of expertise is public safety services, which encompasses the following areas and beyond: organizational development, leadership and ethics, training, assessment of calls for service workload, staffing requirements analysis, design of standards and hiring guidelines for police and fire chief recruitment, police/fire consolidation, community-oriented policing, and city/county/regional mergers.

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## **Executive Summary**

The methodology and framework of this study incorporated several distinct phases: data collection, interviews with key police and administration personnel, on-site observations of the job environment, analysis of data, comparative analyses, alternatives and recommendations, and submission and oral briefings.

This report discusses issues and concerns in a number of areas. ICMA believes it provides sound, contemporary concepts to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and performance of the Casa Grande Police Department (CGPD).

- The CGPD is almost entirely reactionary and does little in the way of proactive enforcement.
- The patrol division is over-committed to calls for service (CFS) responsibilities. Measures need to be taken to alleviate this burden and the department needs to commit resources to this important function. The CGPD needs to add personnel to the patrol division, reconfigure the work schedule to meet demand, and triage calls that result in CFS.
- Crime in Casa Grande is at alarmingly high levels and is substantially higher than cities of similar size in Arizona. The CGPD must implement a crime management process such as COMPSTAT to address high levels of violent and property crime.
- The CGPD must develop strategic and tactical plans to address its future needs and direction, as well as specific plans to address crime and quality of life issues. ICMA analysis shows that there is a lack of planning at all levels in the organization. The strategic planning process should incorporate overall plans for the department as well as specific crime management and tactical plans.

- The CGPD must implement, or reconstitute, several administrative committees, including a personnel committee and disciplinary committee, to address a perception of arbitrariness within the department. This perception is eroding morale and needs to be addressed immediately. There are several vacancies in specialized assignments, and filling those positions must be accomplished through a new process.
- The CGPD should seek accreditation.
- The CGPD should seek to staff positions in the following areas: IT Manager, Intelligence, Crime Analysis, Training Coordinator, and Accreditation. These positions should report to the deputy chief.
- The CGPD should eliminate the position of special operations commander and transfer the responsibilities of this position to the patrol division.
- Investigators must adjust their work schedule to include nights and weekends so they can be more responsive to investigative demands and crime trends.
- The narcotics and special enforcement units need to be fully staffed. They need to refocus their operational mission more on addressing the conditions that precipitate violent and property crime in the community.
- Communications within the CGPD and with external entities is dysfunctional and steps must be taken to correct this situation immediately.

ICMA staff thank the city and police administrations of Casa Grande for their assistance in completing this project. In particular, ICMA commends City Manager James Thompson and Police Chief Robert Huddleston for their enthusiasm and cooperation with ICMA staff regarding documentation requests and the overall project.

## **I. Introduction**

Policing involves a complex set of activities. Police officers are not simply crime fighters whose responsibilities are to protect people's safety and property and to enhance the public's sense of security. The police have myriad other basic responsibilities on a daily basis, including preserving order in the community, guaranteeing the movement of pedestrian and vehicular traffic, protecting and extending the rights of persons to speak and assemble freely, and providing assistance for those who cannot assist themselves.

The Casa Grande Police Department (CGPD) provides a full range of police services, which include responding to emergencies and calls for service, performing directed activities, and solving problems.

The police department has seventy-six sworn officers, including a chief, a deputy chief, three commanders, eleven sergeants, five corporals, and fifty-five police officers. The department's services include patrol, school resource, investigations, traffic, and crime prevention.

The community of Casa Grande is active and growing, with new developments underway. Casa Grande is located in Southern Arizona between Phoenix and Tucson on Interstate 10. Its population is about 45,000. Both the city and the police department are dedicated to the principles of community policing, and volunteerism has an important role in the Casa Grande community.

## **II. Methodology**

### **Data Analysis**

This report utilizes numerous sources of data to support conclusions and recommendations for the Casa Grande Police Department. Information was obtained from the FBI Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program, Part I Index, Crime and Police Officer headcounts; the Arizona Council of Government reports on demographic data; and numerous sources of CGPD internal information, including data mining from the computer-aided dispatch (CAD) system for information on calls for service (CFS).

### **Focus Groups**

A focus group is an unstructured group interview in which the moderator actively encourages discussion among participants. Focus groups generally consist of eight to ten participants and are used to explore issues that are difficult to define. Group discussion permits greater exploration of topics. For the purposes of this study, focus groups were held with representatives of all ranks in the department: police officers, corporals, sergeants, and the command staff.

### **Document Review**

ICMA consultants were furnished with numerous reports and summary documents by the Casa Grande Police Department. Information on strategic plans, personnel staffing and deployment, evaluations, training records, and performance statistics were provided to ICMA.

### **Survey**

A self-administered survey was distributed electronically to all sworn personnel of the department. The survey asked questions pertaining to communications, relationships, work conditions, and general satisfaction

levels within the department. The information from the survey was used to support other areas of the report.

### **Operational/Administrative Observations**

Over the course of the evaluation period numerous observations were conducted. These included observations of general patrol, special enforcement, investigations, and administrative functions. ICMA representatives engaged all facets of department operations from a “participant observation” perspective.

### **Implementing the Report’s Recommendations**

ICMA’s conclusions and recommendations are a blueprint for both the city and police administrations. The city administration should have periodic meetings with the CGPD to ensure that ICMA’s recommendations are implemented. It is strongly recommended that the city manager identify and task one individual with responsibility for implementing these recommendations. This person/position should be external to the organization, should establish a liaison with the chief of police, and should be given the authority and responsibility to effectuate the changes recommended. This includes ensuring the recommendations are executed in a timely fashion and evaluating the department’s progress every six months for efficiency, effectiveness, and performance.

All of ICMA’s recommendations are practical and sensible and should be implemented by the police administration within a reasonable period of time. If the city desires, ICMA can provide a service to periodically review, monitor, and reevaluate the department’s progress and ensure that the recommendations are implemented properly. If the police administration continues to have difficulty implementing the recommendations, ICMA can assist with implementation.

### **III. Conclusions and Recommendations**

#### **A. Administration**

##### *Strategic Planning*

One hallmark of effective management and administration is strategic planning. There is an expression “people don’t plan to fail, they fail to plan.” In a community that is growing as rapidly as Casa Grande, strategic planning is not a luxury, it is essential.

Based upon the analysis by ICMA, it is clear that there is a lack of strategic planning within the CGPD. Census projections indicate substantial population growth for the area and the CGPD has not planned effectively for this growth. The CGPD prepares an annual report, but this is largely retrospective. A greater emphasis needs to be placed on the future. A document entitled “Growth Planning” (revised July 2008) was produced to examine future staffing needs. While this is a good beginning, it is imperative that a much more thorough and comprehensive strategic plan be prepared.

Similarly, there is a lack of planning to address the substantial crime problem facing the community. At a minimum, plans need to be drafted to address specific categories of crime (violent, property, or shooting, robbery, burglary, etc.), as well as the other problems facing the community. During the document review process of this study, we requested the department’s plan to reduce burglary. Not only did such a plan/strategy not exist, there was a lack of understanding as to why such a plan was necessary. Proper planning prevents poor performance and the CGPD needs to fully embrace the planning process.

This lack of strategic planning translates into an organization without vision. From the view of both the city administrators and the police rank and file

officers, the lack of concrete planning in the context of community growth is perceived as a lack of vision. The department is perceived to be lacking the wherewithal to evolve and change to meet the growing demands of the community. We heard on numerous occasions the comment “the department has no vision.” Translated into organizational terms, this means there is no clear plan for the organization to grow and evolve with a rapidly growing and evolving external environment. The perception is that the CGPD is standing still, stuck in time, while the rest of the world is passing it by. Again, the lack of planning and the lack of strategic management are driving these sentiments. Also, this perceived lack of vision is considered synonymous with a lack of leadership in the organization.

It was reported on numerous occasions that the command staff of the department lack vision and leadership. This sentiment likely stems from the lack of strategic planning and the department’s ability to deal effectively with the issues it faces. This sentiment was reported throughout the interviews and focus groups with members of the CGPD and members of the city government. It was also supported by the employee survey, which was critical of the ability of the chief, deputy chief, and command staff to lead the department.

**Recommendation:** The CGPD needs to develop and implement strategic plans to manage its future direction. This should be done immediately. It is recommended that five- and ten-year plans be developed as well as “issue-specific” plans (see below). Strategic plans should include: an analysis of the mission and vision for the department; goals and objectives; an analysis of the environment and the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats to the department; specific plans/strategies to accomplish the plan’s goals; and methods to evaluate the effectiveness of the plan. This process should be done for the CGPD as a whole and in the context of the COMPSTAT process as described in the next section.

## *COMPSTAT*

COMPSTAT, which is an acronym for “comparative statistics,” is a crime management tool developed by the New York City Police Department (NYPD) in 1994.

In general terms, COMPSTAT is a process that combines strategic planning, performance measures, and accountability to focus organizational performance on the reduction of crime and the improvement in quality of life in the community. The four principles of COMPSTAT are: accurate and timely intelligence, effective tactics, rapid deployment, and relentless follow-up. The CGPD needs to embrace this approach to address the serious crime problems facing the city.

According to the 2009 FBI report “Crime in the United States,” rates of serious crime in Casa Grande are at alarmingly high levels. Exhibit 1 provides crime rate information for Casa Grande, seven Arizona cities with a population similar to Casa Grande, the United States, and Arizona. It shows that the violent crime rate (rate of murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault per 100,000 people) in Casa Grande is 37.6 percent higher than the national average, 43.8 percent higher than the state average, and at least 74.8 percent higher than in cities of similar population in Arizona.

Also, the rate of property crime (rate of burglary, theft, and motor vehicle theft per 100,000 people) in Casa Grande is 113.7 percent higher, or more than double, the national average, 82.4 percent higher than the average in Arizona, and at least 71.6 percent higher than in cities of similar size in Arizona. Stated more directly, the rate of serious crime (violent and property crime rate together) is 75 percent higher in Casa Grande than it is in cities of similar size in Arizona. As shown in the exhibit, Casa Grande has a higher rate of crime in both categories than Maricopa, Oro Valley, Sierra Vista, Prescott, Bullhead City, Prescott Valley, and Marana.

## Exhibit 1. Crime Rate Comparisons for Violent and Property Crime

Location	Population	Violent crime	Rate of violent crime	Property crime	Rate of property crime
Casa Grande	43,254	254	587.23	2,806	6,487.26
U.S.	307,006,550	1,318,398	429.44	9,320,971	3,036.08
Arizona	6,595,778	26,929	408.28	234,582	3,556.55
Prescott	43,748	147	336.02	1,238	2,829.84
Prescott Valley	40,539	127	313.28	692	1,707.00
Sierra Vista	43,956	111	252.53	1,397	3,178.18
Bullhead City	41,721	65	155.80	1,577	3,779.87
Marana	38,028	46	120.96	1,011	2,658.57
Maricopa	52,200	52	99.62	896	1,716.48
Oro Valley	44,854	21	46.82	691	1,540.55

Note: The rate is expressed as incidents per 100,000 population.

Data obtained from the CGPD indicate that crime in Casa Grande has been on the decline over the last decade, even when accounting for population growth. While this is a positive sign, crime in Casa Grande is still alarmingly high.

There are many reasons why crime might be higher in Casa Grande. The COMPSTAT process has been demonstrated to be an effective police response to crime in other jurisdictions and the implementation of COMPSTAT in Casa Grande is recommended. Several members of the CGPD administration have already begun research into COMPSTAT and/or other crime management processes. Visits have been made to the Mesa Police Department, as well as a recent conference on crime analysis, to learn and observe the COMPSTAT process. It is recommended that the initiative to adopt COMPSTAT in the CGPD be moved ahead immediately. This recommendation can be combined with other recommendations in this report to transition the CGPD into an effective crime management organization.

**Recommendation:** Adopt the COMPSTAT process and make a concerted effort to obtain the necessary training and equipment to support this approach. While the initial approach of evaluating other agencies and attending conferences is commended, a much more rigorous approach is necessary. It is also recommended that the deputy chief be made responsible for this function. The management of crime and quality of life issues will go hand-in-hand with the development of strategic plans and should be embraced by all levels of the organization.

COMPSTAT begins with accurate and timely information, and evolves into the development of tactics and plans, then the execution of those plans. It continues with a thorough follow-up to determine if those plans had an impact on crime.

At a minimum, the CGPD must routinely conduct an analysis that identifies the times, days, and locations most associated with serious crime so that it can deploy the resources needed at those times, days, and locations to disrupt crime. Also, the CGPD must examine the underlying conditions that contribute to crime in the first place. For example, some of the burglaries committed in Casa Grande are committed by drug addicts supporting their habits. The department should ask: Who are these drug addicts, where do they live, do they have warrants, how do they get to the crime scene, what is done with the stolen property? The answers to these questions are the foundation of the "burglary" plan, or more specifically, where and when is burglary occurring, who is committing burglary, and what is the department going to do about it. This effort, or plan, must also integrate every element of the organization, from patrol, to investigations, to training, to traffic.

## *Policy Development*

ICMA reviewed the rules, regulations, policies, and procedure manuals in use in the CGPD. In general, ICMA found that the documents provide direction and guidance to officers and civilians in the department.

During our study, the command staff indicated an interest in applying to the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc. (CALEA) for accreditation. ICMA endorses this effort and recommends that the CGPD pursue CALEA accreditation. Accreditation will assist the CGPD in developing and creating a system of policy oversight that meets industry standards.

The chief advised that the CGPD has not applied for CALEA; however, it is the department's intention to tackle this program after the move into a new building. The chief also believes it will be advantageous to have a dedicated accreditation manager on board when this endeavor is taken on. The current budget does not have such a position slated for FY 2009–10.

CALEA is a nationally recognized program to acknowledge professional police excellence. The program is a progressive and proven way of helping a law enforcement agency calculate and improve overall performance.

The program is based on standards that contain a clear statement of professional objectives. An agency that participates in the program conducts a thorough self-analysis to determine how existing operations can be adapted to meet the objectives. CALEA acknowledges the implementation of policies and procedures that are conceptually sound and operationally effective. Achieving the standards reflects professionalism and raises the department's performance. Accreditation will prove to the department and all concerned, especially Casa Grande residents, that the CGPD is an effective and professional law enforcement agency.

**Recommendation:** Pursue CALEA accreditation both as means to professionalize the organization and update existing policies.

Accreditation through CALEA is an excellent step toward professionalizing CGPD policies.

ICMA examined the most critical CGPD policies in place to compare them to commonly accepted police practices. The policies we reviewed were those covering use of force, firearms, and less-than-lethal weapons; vehicle pursuit; domestic violence; handling the mentally ill; and reports of misconduct.

Use of Force and Weapons – Chapter 42 governing the use of force and weapons policy was put in effect on 02/01/2001 and revised on 09/05/2007. We found it to have all the essential elements of a sound use of force policy. The application of force is described, with prohibitions and guidelines for the use of force. The force continuum is presented, and an appropriate discussion on the use and application of less-than-lethal devices are also presented. Also, current research on the use of conductive energy devices is incorporated.

Vehicle Pursuit – Chapter 4.08B governing police vehicle pursuit was reviewed. This policy was updated on 04/14/2010. It was found to contain a progressive and professional application of current police management practices. Anecdotal information was disclosed during the ICMA review that this policy is not viewed favorably by the rank-and-file of the organization. Examination of the policy, however, reveals it to be sound and if implemented correctly, it will provide a prudent and manageable approach to this area of police operations. This will become particularly evident as the community of Casa Grande grows.

Special Populations – Chapter 46: Sections 46.03 – Mentally Ill, and 46.10 – Domestic Violence, were reviewed. These policies were put into effect on 02/01/2001 and have not been updated. While they contain the general provisions of sound police practices, their critical nature requires continuous review and revision. It is recommended that these policies be reviewed to ensure they incorporate up-to-date information pertaining to Arizona law and police tactics. Both sections were found to be lacking in a description of tactical approaches to these special populations and these policies should be modified to incorporate this information.

Complaints of Misconduct – Chapter 16 governing internal affairs was reviewed. The manual details a comprehensive policy and a prudent approach to the investigation and adjudication of internal complaints within the agency.

However, a remarkable level of discontent with the administration of the policy was discovered during the ICMA review. It is clear that the policy written is not the policy implemented within the agency.

Consistent with other recommendations in this report, it is recommended that this area of management be revisited and changes implemented to ensure a workable internal affairs policy. This will improve organizational integrity **and** morale. Similarly, it is recommended that a provision of the procedure be created to handle complaints against members of the CGPD in higher ranks. The current procedures task the administrative sergeant with the responsibility for investigating misconduct. When the complaint is against a sergeant, commander, or chief, this responsibility should be given to a different person. For example, when the complaint is against a sergeant, a commander should be the investigating officer.

Additionally, while a section of this policy pertains to a citizen complaint against an officer, it is recommended that a separate section of the manual be dedicated to these types of complaints. This will enable the CGPD to refine different types of conduct with respect to complaints from citizens, and distinguish a separate reporting and investigation procedure that contemplates the involvement of the citizen complainant.

In general, the CGPD Policy Manual appears sound. The text is well written, clear, and appropriate areas of police practice are covered.

At numerous points during the ICMA review a problematic situation was raised with respect to policy development and implementation. There is a strong sentiment within the organization that the policy process is undermined by lengthy and unnecessary review by city management. Numerous examples were given to support this contention.

One such example involved the development and implementation of the K-9 program. At the direction of the city council pursuant to an informational briefing, the CGPD was directed to develop and implement a K-9 program. Research was conducted, equipment identified, and policies written, only to have the policy stall while under review by the city administration. According to the CGPD, it took more than 18 months for the K-9 program to go from an idea to actual implementation, delayed mostly because of administrative review. The impact of such a protracted process has a negative effect on the climate in the CGPD.

Delays in policy development and implementation can have adverse effects. In the present environment in the CGPD, delay is breeding frustration. There is a lack of sensitivity to the legal, political, and economic ramifications to certain policies, and this manifests itself into the appearance that the command staff and chief are ineffective.

While delays are a normal part of the process, excessive delays create the perception that the agency is without direction. Delay also creates an adverse managerial environment. There is a sense of organizational "malaise," and it is pervasive in the CGPD. Organizational malaise, similar to physical malaise, is a chronic condition in which there is an ill-feeling, an out-of-sorts feeling, accompanied by lethargy, cynicism, and despair. The condition a human being experiences from the onset of a disease, or a long period of illness, is often described as feeling listless, lacking motivation, "the blues," or malaise. The CGPD appears to be suffering from a condition of organizational malaise.

The symptoms of this condition are clear, and they are manifested by a general decrease in morale, a perceived lack of vision and leadership, lack of progress on change, and lack of progress on policy implementation. All of the elements discussed above contribute to this, and the combination of these events has bred frustration; frustration has bred cynicism; and cynicism is breeding a belief that the CGPD is not being managed.

According to one ranking member of the CGPD, "it seems we've lost control of our own department!" Statements like this are divisive and create that "malaise." Officers only see delay and inaction, and this is perceived as mismanagement. The end result is a lack of confidence in the organization, and an inhibition towards making policy recommendations because "nothing ever happens, so why bother?"

**Recommendation:** Streamline the policy development/approval process. Create finite deadlines for administrative approval and review. Give authority to the CGPD to internally develop, review, and implement routine policies.

## *Organizational*

Based on our examination of the CGPS, its operations, demand for service, and organizational structure, we are making the following recommendations with respect to the creation and elimination of several positions.

### a. Eliminate the position Commander – Special Operations

This position can be eliminated. Compared to other commander duties in the CGPD, this position is clearly the least demanding. With fewer than fifteen direct reports, this position does not require a commander. The duties and responsibilities of special operations in the CGPD can be handled by a sergeant. The Sergeant – Special Operations can be placed under the command of the Patrol Division Commander.

### b. IT Manager, CALEA Coordinator, Planning, Crime Analysis and Intelligence positions

Currently, the CGPD does not have officers or civilian personnel occupying these positions. In the short term, these vacancies are sustainable, but in the long term strong consideration must be given to staffing these positions. If the department engages the CALEA accreditation process, an accreditation coordinator will be essential. Similarly, a strategic planning officer/civilian will be essential as the CGPD develops and implements its COMPSTAT process. Also, an intelligence officer who bridges the gap between investigations, special enforcement, and crime analysis will be essential as the CGPD implements its crime management strategies and seeks to maximize the deployment of enforcement personnel.

Lastly, as the CGPD moves into its new headquarters, and develops new processes, integration of information technology with police operations will be essential. It is recommended that a position be created and staffed with a civilian employee who can identify, purchase, install, and maintain the IT

infrastructure. This position would yield benefits immediately. As the organization grows, this position will be critical.

### *Processes*

During the course of the ICMA analysis, it was made very clear that there is deep dissatisfaction with the manner in which the department makes selections to specialized assignments and training, as well as how it conducts the disciplinary process. Broad statements were made that the "good old boy" network is in place, and you need to be the "favorite" in order to get a desired position and/or training slot. Similarly, the department's disciplinary process suffers from the same allegations.

#### a. Selection to Specialized Positions and Training

In an agency the size of the CGPD, specialized positions are limited. Examination of the organizational chart indicates that investigations, special enforcement, narcotics, traffic, SRO, and crime prevention are the opportunities for lateral transfer within the agency. Filling these positions with qualified people is essential, and even more critical is the need to demonstrate to the entire agency that the positions are filled based on merit.

A system based on merit is also one based on fairness. And from the perspectives of career development, employee motivation, and department morale this merit/fairness principle must be strictly maintained. The current process falls far short of these goals. While it appears to take the merit/fairness principle into consideration, the process is creating a divisive and negative work environment.

According to Section 30.20 of the CGPD manual, when a specialized position is available, the chief distributes a memorandum to all eligible employees announcing the position, and requests the employee to submit a request to

be considered for that position. In addition, the chief will solicit input from sergeants pertaining to the officers who submit requests for the assignment. (Specific input is sought from the sergeant of the officer submitting the request and from the sergeant of the unit of the vacant position). With the officers' requests and supervisory feedback, the chief and command staff review the applications, supervisor input, and performance indicators (such as monthly activity, evaluations, disciplinary record, etc.). They make a decision based on this information.

This process is not satisfactory because it is perceived to be unfair and biased. It is contributing to poor morale in the agency.

This process is also too passive, in that it requests feedback from the supervisors without specifically *requiring* feedback. Also, employees have no voice in the process other than their application. In general, therefore, the entire system is perceived to be arbitrary and capricious and assignments left to the whim of the administration.

**Recommendation:** Create a new process utilizing a personnel board that can meet periodically (or as the need arises) to interview and screen candidates for special assignments. As with to the current practice, when a specialized position becomes available a notice should be distributed to all eligible employees seeking their application. When applications are received, all eligible employees should be screened by the personnel board and evaluated on specific, predetermined criteria relevant to the position being filled.

The board should be constituted of the sergeant of the prospective unit, another sergeant designated by the chief, and a third designated by the employee organization (or selected from a rotation of sergeants based on a predetermined list if the employee designee is not a viable option). When a sergeant's vacancy is being considered, the commanders should be the

board members. (It is recommended that the board be made up of at least three supervisors in the next higher rank than the officer seeking a specialized assignment.)

A suggested process is as follows. The board should convene, interview each candidate, and screen them according to objective criteria. For example, if an assignment is being considered to the traffic unit, objective criteria might consist of prior traffic enforcement activity, accident reconstruction training, specialized DUI or DRE training, and driving record. Upon completion of screening, the personnel board should recommend to the chief at least two candidates in priority order, specifying the rationale for selecting these candidates. Candidates not recommended by the board must be notified by the board and given the reasons why they were not selected. The chief would then have ultimate authority to select one of the candidates recommended by the board or specific reasons why the board's recommendations are not viable.

According to Section 08.02 of the CGPD manual, a training committee reports to the chief and is responsible for the training function in the department. A review of this section of the manual indicates a passive and administrative approach to training. It is recommended that the responsibility of this committee be changed so that it can take an active and operational role in the training requirements of the CGPD.

The committee, in the spirit of professional development, should take an active role in identifying training needs for both individual employees and operational needs of the department. The capabilities of officers with training credentials should be utilized. Certified trainers in the CGPD should be tasked by the training committee to develop blocks of instruction and deliver this instruction to the officers. There is a ready and able force of trainers inside the CGPD who can be used to promote professional development in

the agency. Similarly, the committee should embrace employee mentoring and leader development programs at all ranks. Leadership development first contemplates personal and professional growth and development and this process needs to be embraced vigorously. Deficiencies should be identified and corrected through proper training programs if possible.

Also, this committee should evaluate training opportunities in context and make recommendations to the chief in order to fill sought-after training programs, courses, and venues. The chief, or designee, should oversee the operations of this committee to ensure that there is full transparency. Training assignments must be made based on need, and not through an arbitrary and biased manner.

b. Discipline

Section 37.00 of the CGPD manual governs the disciplinary process in the department. Several modifications can be made to this section to improve the overall function of the process and improve morale.

The Disciplinary process suffers from the same perceived bias and unfairness as the personnel process, as discussed earlier. In general, good order and discipline is paramount in a police agency, and the authority to govern this process should rest with the chief. The current system in the CGPD, however, is not achieving the desired result. Rather, it is creating division and dissent.

According to the survey conducted by ICMA, an overwhelming majority of officers in the CGPD believe the current system to be unfair and inconsistent. This was supported by numerous comments both in group and individual interviews. Allegations were made of high-ranking members of the department using their department vehicles off-duty for personal use. Comments were made that "nothing was done" to the offenders. Officers

said that if they were found culpable for the same conduct they would be disciplined and have the privilege of the department auto removed. Similarly, there was an allegation wherein a member of the department gave false statements during an official investigation. Typically in the CGPD, providing false statements is a termination offense, but because this person was a "favorite," only an admonishment was administered.

Granted these allegations are just that: allegations. They are unsupported, but nonetheless, there is a strong sentiment that "favorite" and high-ranking officers receive preferential discipline, or worse, are exempt from the disciplinary process altogether. Furthermore, officers believe the process is corrupt and suffers from a lack of transparency, and that once a determination is reached there is no due process to argue your case.

**Recommendation:** Create a disciplinary process that is perceived to be fair, protects officers' rights, and maintains ultimate authority for adjudication and decision and penalty with the chief.

- i. Create a Disciplinary Matrix

The disciplinary process should include a schedule or matrix of offenses and related penalties. Section 37.00 in the CGPD manual contains a list of 23 types of misconduct. It is recommended that this list be evaluated and specific penalties for violation of these sections be created. Similar to sentencing guidelines, categories of misconduct could be evaluated in context of offender/officer characteristics, with a range of possible penalties, with provisions for aggravating and mitigating factors. For example, the first offense for improper use of department vehicle (off-duty personal use) could be loss of privileges for one month. For the second offense, the penalty could be increased to a loss of five vacation days and loss of privileges for six months.

## ii. Create a Disciplinary Board

Section 37.00 also has a provision that gives officers an opportunity to appeal to the city personnel board. It is recommended that a different, and internal, board be created with regard to disciplinary matters within the department. Similar in constitution to the personnel board, the disciplinary board would be charged with evaluating the rules and regulations of the CGPD and establishing categories of offenses and related penalties for violating those offenses.

The Disciplinary Board would also identify a range of penalties and a system of progressive discipline where repeated offenses are treated more harshly. This board should also be tasked with evaluating misconduct, conducting an investigation, arriving at a finding, and making a recommendation to the chief for final adjudication. The chief would have the ultimate decision with respect to both the findings and the penalty imposed. Lastly, officers should be given the opportunity to appeal the final decision, as well as have a voice in the entire process.

### *Professional Development*

The CGPD must create a real and workable training policy and embed this policy in a broader initiative of career development and mentoring. Survey results indicate that officers have a strong affiliation with the department and are generally satisfied with their careers. This is a positive sign and a clear opportunity to embrace a general organizational philosophy of leadership and career development and mentoring.

A newly constituted personnel board should examine the elements of an officer's career and develop milestones that signify that career development. Milestones can come in the form of specialized training courses and seminars, post-secondary formal education, specialized assignments, and

specialized skill sets. An officer's personnel record would become more than just a folder of old evaluations and time sheets. It would capture the embodiment of an officer's career and what the officer has done to further that career, or not. These milestones should be developed collaboratively and can be used to evaluate individuals for promotion, transfer, and in the disciplinary process.

Mentoring – One of the most critical responsibilities of an effective leader is to groom his or her replacement and cultivate future leaders in the organization. According to reports from sergeants, corporals, and officers, this mentoring process is lacking in the CGPD. It could have a very positive upside for the department.

A comprehensive and department-wide program on leadership development must be implemented. This can come in the form of encouraging independent courses, formal training in-house, or outside training opportunities but the bottom-line is that leadership training and development, with a specific focus on mentoring, is essential.

### *Overtime*

In FY 2008–2009 the total overtime pay for the CGPD was \$471,595. The police administration reports that in FY 2009–2010 they anticipate a reduction in this expense. According to the police administration, the overtime should be significantly less this year than last.

## **B. Operational**

### *Patrol*

Patrol is considered the backbone of any police department and is the area of police operations that has the most frequent contact with the public. Calls for service (CFS) through 911, directed patrol, and general enforcement activities are the heart of traditional policing. The CGPD is like most police departments in the U.S., dedicating the bulk of its resources to patrol.

According to the department's organizational chart (revised 1/14/2010), the patrol division is led by a commander and staffed with six sergeants, five corporals, forty police officers, and seven civilians (one police aide and six PTOs). The division is divided into five teams of officers responsible for shift and relief coverage 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Teams A, B, and C are assigned steady tours – day, swing, and graveyard, respectively. Teams D and E perform relief duty, alternating tours during the week. Each team works 10-hour shifts and has steady days off (with a slight modification for Team A, which selects days off each week).

The day shift is 0700x1700 hours, the swing shift is 1630x0230 hours, and the graveyard shift is 2130x0730 hours. This configuration allows for a thirty-minute overlap between the graveyard-day shifts, and the day-swing shifts. This allows sergeants to brief the squads and still provide continuous patrol coverage. There is a greater overlap between the swing and graveyard shifts, with four hours (2130x0230 hours) of double-shift patrol. The patrol schedule both accommodates a 10-hour work shift and seems to offer optimal deployment of resources. There did not appear to be any great level of dissatisfaction with the current schedule from either the officers or the command staff.

Examination of the demand for patrol services, however, indicates several stress points and a less-than-optimal deployment strategy. Exhibits 2 through 5 illustrate the relationship between calls for service (CFS) and basic patrol availability. CFS demand in these tables is calculated as all service time recorded through the CAD system for CGPD units working during a given hour/day. (Please see the Data Analysis section for more information.)

CFS demand is made up of 911 calls from the community at large (other-initiated calls) and assignments initiated by the police officers themselves (police-initiated). Police-initiated calls can include direct patrols, administrative assignments, assignments directly from community members, etc. Basic patrol is calculated as the number of police units assigned to patrol duties (regular CFS response units) at a given hour/day. In addition to basic patrol, the CGPD also deploys specialized units (traffic, SRO, SEU, etc.) that are available to respond to CFS, but have other primary responsibilities.

The first column of each of the four exhibits lists the hour of the day from 0 to 23, with 0 including times between 00:00 hours through 00:59 hours, and so on.

The second column is a calculation of the demand for each hour. This figure is calculated by taking the average number of calls received during that given hour, and multiplying it by the average amount of time it takes to handle a CFS. The result is the amount of time, in hours, that is required to process the average number of CFS that are generated at that hour of the day.

The third column displays basic patrol availability for each hour. This figure is calculated by counting the number of units from basic patrol (Teams A through E) that are working at that given time.

The right-most column is a percentage of the amount of basic patrol availability compared to the demand for CFS. A value of 100 percent in this column means that, on average, all of the manpower available on basic patrol is committed to CFS.

Examination of the four tables indicates an enormous demand for CFS that at times overwhelms the basic patrol function of the CGPD. There is a wide range of average workload on weekdays in the two months examined, from a low of 33.2 percent during the 0300x0359 hour on August weekdays to a high of 170 percent during the 0800x0859 hour on February weekdays.

Weekday workload demands during both February and August from the hours of 0800 to 1600 far outweigh the availability of basic patrol. The data indicate that essentially 100 percent of the time available for basic patrol units is occupied with CFS, and additional resources need to be diverted from other operations within the department to meet CFS demand.

The next block of eight hours, from 1600x2400 hours indicate a similar stress on basic patrol. Again, there is a very large demand for CFS during this time block, which almost, but not quite overwhelms the basic patrol function. It is only during the late night/early morning hours of 0000x0800 hours that the CFS demand and workload abate to manageable levels.

In sum, the basic patrol resources of the CGPD are entirely committed to CFS and there is little time to commit to anything else but this activity. In fact, the demand for CFS overwhelms the basic patrol function and must be met by resources outside basic patrol. The bottom line here for the CGPD is that the basic patrol function is entirely **reactive**, with little time to commit to any other activity. To the extent proactive patrol is accomplished, it is done within an extraordinary demand to answer CFS. Thus, it cannot be structured or organized in a systematic manner that would enable the basic

patrol function of the CGPD to address crime, disorder, traffic, or other community problems that might be a priority.

**Exhibit 2. August 2009 Weekday Average Workload for Basic Patrol**

<b>Hour</b>	<b>CFS Demand</b>	<b>Basic Patrol Availability</b>	<b>Percent Workload</b>
0	6.00	11.5	52.1
1	5.71	11.1	51.6
2	4.27	10.0	42.9
3	2.34	7.1	33.2
4	3.51	6.3	55.7
5	5.89	6.1	97.4
6	8.33	5.9	142.3
7	10.21	11.6	88.4
8	10.03	7.7	131.2
9	7.87	7.4	106.3
10	10.10	8.1	125.5
11	9.57	8.2	116.8
12	9.40	8.3	113.3
13	10.30	8.4	123.4
14	8.07	8.3	97.2
15	7.77	8.2	94.7
16	8.41	9.6	88.1
17	5.72	8.3	68.9
18	5.68	7.8	72.8
19	5.14	7.8	66.3
20	5.71	7.3	78.2
21	5.72	7.1	81.1
22	8.93	11.1	80.9
23	8.31	12.0	69.2

**Exhibit 3. August 2009 Weekend Average Workload for Basic Patrol**

<b>Hour</b>	<b>CFS Demand</b>	<b>Basic Patrol Availability</b>	<b>Percent Workload</b>
0	7.66	13.1	58.4
1	6.79	12.0	56.6
2	6.37	11.5	55.4
3	4.96	8.5	58.4
4	4.77	7.3	65.7
5	4.70	6.3	75.2
6	5.27	6.3	84.4
7	6.83	10.8	63.5
8	4.83	5.6	85.8
9	4.67	5.5	85.0
10	4.63	5.4	86.1
11	4.41	5.4	82.1
12	5.64	5.4	104.8
13	5.35	5.4	99.5
14	4.75	5.3	90.4
15	5.16	5.3	98.4
16	4.71	5.5	85.6
17	4.25	5.5	77.3
18	4.43	5.5	80.5
19	5.88	6.4	92.2
20	3.11	6.4	48.7
21	9.49	6.8	140.5
22	5.25	11.1	47.2
23	6.33	11.5	55.0

**Exhibit 4. February 2009 Weekday Average Workload for Basic Patrol**

<b>Hour</b>	<b>CFS Demand</b>	<b>Basic Patrol Availability</b>	<b>Percent Workload</b>
0	6.96	11.1	62.7
1	5.00	10.9	45.8
2	2.85	7.0	41.0
3	2.82	6.4	44.3
4	3.49	5.8	60.6
5	6.59	5.7	115.6
6	5.56	5.7	97.5
7	10.09	12.3	82.0
8	14.96	8.8	170.0
9	8.94	8.9	101.0
10	9.36	9.0	104.6
11	12.45	9.4	133.2
12	10.08	9.5	106.1
13	10.56	9.5	111.7
14	9.23	9.4	98.2
15	11.54	9.6	120.9
16	8.87	14.3	62.0
17	6.67	8.5	78.5
18	6.78	7.8	86.9
19	6.16	7.6	81.5
20	7.15	7.3	97.9
21	7.86	7.0	113.0
22	7.57	10.3	73.9
23	6.53	11.5	57.0

**Exhibit 5. February 2009 Weekend Average Workload for Basic Patrol**

<b>Hour</b>	<b>CFS Demand</b>	<b>Basic Patrol Availability</b>	<b>Percent Workload</b>
0	8.73	11.6	75.1
1	6.21	11.0	56.5
2	5.69	8.0	71.2
3	3.94	5.6	70.0
4	3.56	5.6	63.2
5	2.43	5.4	45.3
6	3.47	5.4	64.6
7	8.29	10.0	82.9
8	2.79	7.4	37.9
9	5.36	7.1	75.3
10	5.74	6.9	83.5
11	7.92	6.8	117.3
12	5.18	7.0	74.0
13	7.29	7.1	102.3
14	6.14	7.1	86.2
15	7.06	7.1	99.1
16	7.59	10.0	75.9
17	5.64	6.4	88.5
18	6.11	5.8	106.3
19	6.76	5.9	115.0
20	5.90	6.1	96.3
21	11.01	5.8	191.4
22	9.00	10.1	88.9
23	7.75	10.1	76.5

Based upon this analysis of CFS demand, it is clear that demand for police resources is severely testing the department's capabilities. The data analysis describes this dilemma, and the employee survey and ICMA observations confirm this situation. According to the survey, there is almost universal agreement that more resources need to be deployed in patrol. This sentiment was reported numerous times to ICMA staff, and CSF volume and strain were observed first-hand by the ICMA team.

Overall, several things are necessary to properly align demand with resources. The following recommendations are offered to alleviate the burden on patrol and modify the approach from a completely reactionary force to one that includes a proactive approach to crime, disorder, and community concerns. Our three recommendations can be explored simultaneously, and the end result should create faster response times, better service, and more time for patrol officers to engage in proactive deployment and community policing.

In general a "Rule of 60" can be applied to evaluate patrol staffing. This rule contemplates that 60 percent of the sworn officers in a department should be dedicated to the patrol function, and that no more than 60 percent of their time be committed to CFS. This is not a hard-and-fast rule, but a starting point for discussion on patrol deployment. Resource allocation decisions must be made from a policy and/or managerial perspective through which costs and benefits of competing demands are considered.

This Rule of 60 for patrol deployment does NOT mean the remaining 40 percent of time is "down-time" or break time. This should also be committed time -- not committed due to the demands for CFS, but committed to management-directed operations. This is a more focused use of time and can include supervised allocation of patrol officer activities towards proactive

enforcement, crime prevention, community policing, and citizen safety initiatives.

From an organizational standpoint, it is important to have uniformed patrol resources available at all times of the day to deal with issues such as proactive enforcement and community policing. Patrol is generally the most visible and most available resource in policing and the ability to harness this resource is critical for successful operations. From an officer's standpoint, once a certain level of CFS activity is reached, the officer's focus shifts to a CFS-based reactionary mode. Once a threshold is reached the patrol officer's mindset begins to shift from one that looks for ways to deal with crime and quality-of-life conditions in the community to one that continually prepares for the next CFS. After a point of CFS saturation, officers cease proactive policing and engage in a reactionary style of policing. The outlook becomes "why act proactively when my actions are only going to be interrupted by a CFS." Uncommitted time is spent waiting for the next call. Sixty percent is believed to be the saturation threshold.

Inspection of the organizational chart (revised 1/14/2010) indicates that forty-nine of the department's seventy-six sworn officers (64.5 percent) are assigned to the patrol division. Thus, part I of the "Rule of 60" is met.

Examination of the CFS data indicates that the demand to answer CFS far outstrips the manpower level of the patrol division and workload commitments exceed 100 percent during peak times. Again, this means that the patrol division is almost entirely reactive in nature and can hardly keep pace with the CFS demand. Part II of the "Rule of 60" is broken.

Again, this rule is not a hard-and-fast requirement, but a common-sense benchmark to evaluate patrol staffing levels. Each community is different and has different needs, but it is useful to hold the CGPD up against this

benchmark to get a better understanding of the relative CFS demand and available manpower levels.

## **Recommendations**

### **a. Additional personnel**

Consideration should be given to adding additional personnel to the patrol division. As we saw, ICMA's analysis indicated patrol division resources are overcommitted, in some cases more than 100 percent of the time. This creates a climate of running from CFS to CFS and does not give the officer an opportunity to work on other matters. During the peak hours of 0800x2100, a minimum deployment of ten officers would be considered appropriate. This would require an additional four officers in Teams A and B, and additional officers in the relief teams to respond to the demands for service.

### **b. Realign work schedules**

An alternative to adding personnel to existing teams is to realign work schedules to reflect the demands for CFS. Currently, the CGPD "stretches" existing shift coverage to accommodate these demands. For example, swing shift officers are typically held later into the night, and graveyard shift officers begin work at a time that allows for significant overlap with the swing shift. This "stretching" is done with a combination of overtime pay and scheduling of shift start times. This process is done on an ad hoc basis and consideration should be given to a more permanent and systematic process.

There are numerous renditions of police work plan systems that utilize 8-, 10-, and 12-hour tours. While ICMA does not endorse any one configuration over another, the CGPD should explore alternative work schedules that better align available resources with demand for CFS. The department is currently reviewing a work plan that uses a combination of 8- and 12- hour

tours. Without endorsing this plan over another, we do think it is important that the department explore alternatives to the current work plan. Having a four-hour overlap of two squads from 2130x0230 every night does not seem to address the systemic shortage of available resource at other times during the day.

Short of a wholesale reconfiguration of the work plan schedule, better and more regular analyses of CFS data needs to be performed. CFS data, captured through the CAD system, offers a wealth of knowledge about community demand for police services. This information should be examined regularly to understand the trends in CFS in order to adjust schedules and other resources.

The CGPD should actively pursue a change of the work schedule to better reflect CFS demand and better align resources. Similarly, this new work plan should be based on a thorough and periodic analysis of available data. Current analysis indicates peak demand for service to be from 0800 to 2100 hours. With wide swings in demand as seen in Casa Grande, resources must be properly balanced throughout the day to meet this demand.

The CGPD must also analyze the CAD system each quarter/season and modify patrol deployment accordingly. In order to properly staff shifts, this analysis should be done well in advance of approaching schedule modifications.

#### c. Differential Response

From ICMA's examination of CFS, and through discussions with members of the CGPD, it is clear that the department could benefit from a differential response program to better manage CFS. Currently, little or no "triage" is performed on a call. Virtually every call to the police department is dispatched to a patrol unit. Reports were offered of officers dispatched to

calls that do not require police service, including “nonsense” calls, civil calls, and other situations that are clearly not police related. Several instances were cited in which a caller wanted the police to do something about non-police issues.

The CGPD prides itself on “customer” service and providing police services to a community in an effort to deliver a “small town” or “intimate” style of police service. In a small town, no request is too small and the community and the police work together to create a safe and secure environment. As Casa Grande grows, however, the ability to provide this small-town service is being strained.

**Recommendation:** The CGPD should create a committee to review CFS to identify categories of calls that do not warrant a police response.

In other communities CFS committees have been very effective at identifying CFS that can be shifted away from a direct police response to another service or eliminated altogether. For example, it is common practice in jurisdictions around the U.S. for police to not respond to motor vehicle accidents unless there is an injury, dispute, or one of the vehicles requires a tow. A simple property damage accident is removed from the CFS responsibility of the police.

In order to properly identify these categories of calls, however, the department must undertake a deliberate process. The command staff should create a committee to explore this issue and determine what and how CFS get processed and dispatched. The overall goal of this committee should be to minimize unnecessary CFS while still maintaining a high level of customer service.

In addition to the CFS committee, the department should consider adopting a differential police response program. One of the programs available to

accomplish this is *Tele-service*, a technique for screening and referring service calls by which dispatchers can record reports for certain categories of nonemergency incidents over the telephone. It diverts nonemergency calls from the patrol units, providing officers with more time to engage in proactive and directed patrols or traffic enforcement duties.

Tele-service also can reduce waiting time for complaints of minor problems that may be deferred because of higher priority assignments. Although it is intended to divert assignments from the patrol units, tele-service cannot substitute for the presence of a police officer, nor can it be used to resolve or settle grievances. Tele-service reports related to patrol operations are not diminished in importance. The reports must still be entered into the records management system to aid in planning and deployment strategies.

Calls must be screened to ensure the following:

1. That the offense is not in progress
2. That no one at the location presents a threat to persons or property
3. That there is not an opportunity for an apprehension
4. That the incident is not listed as one that requires an on-scene response
5. That there are neither pieces of physical evidence to be collected nor witnesses present to be interviewed
6. That there are no circumstances present that would lead the dispatcher to believe that a police response would be appropriate (e.g., injuries).

A suggested list of calls that do not require a police response and can be handled by the tele-service includes:

- Lost or stolen cell phone or iPod
- Theft from a vehicle
- Tampering with a vehicle
- Lost or stolen license plates

- Theft of a bicycle
- Larceny, minor thefts (excluding shoplifting and embezzlement)
- Malicious mischief and vandalism
- Lost property
- Threats
- Nuisance telephone calls
- Animal complaints
- Traffic complaints that are not in progress
- Harassment.

For tele-service to be effective, it should include the following:

- Clear specification of types of calls eligible for tele-service
- Ability of the citizen to choose whether or not the call is taken over the phone
- Provision of a mailed copy of the report free of charge to the caller
- Training for the dispatchers to effectively carry out this task
- Review of reports taken over the phone for accuracy and inclusion in any feedback to the patrol squads
- Officers being aware of incidents occurring within their area of responsibility.

The existing dispatch staff and police officers on light duty should be able to perform this task. The city may also want to consider setting up a website for reporting minor incidents or issues such as harassment, malicious damage, and lost or stolen cell phones.

## **C. Investigations**

According to the organizational chart (revised 1/14/2010) the staffing of the criminal investigations division (CID) includes a commander, three sergeants, and eleven investigators.

The general investigations unit (GIU) consists of one sergeant and five investigators; the narcotics unit (NARCS) consists of one sergeant and two investigators; and the special enforcement unit (SEU) consists of one sergeant and four investigators, with one investigator of the SEU assigned to GITTEM. (Note: At the time of this report several personnel changes had been made, but were not indicated on the organizational chart.) In general, investigators in the GIU are scheduled to work weekdays between 0700 and 1700 hours. SEU and NARCS personnel have flexible hours and are assigned at the discretion of their supervisors, and generally work weekdays between 1200 and 2200 hours.

According to the CGPD Annual Report, in calendar year 2009 the city experienced 5 homicides, 33 sexual assaults, 66 robberies, 166 aggravated assaults, 1,022 burglaries, 1,354 thefts, 16 arsons, and 235 motor vehicle thefts. This is an alarmingly high crime rate for a city of the size of Casa Grande.

Exhibit 1, which was discussed earlier in this report, puts the city's crime rate into perspective. According to the table, Casa Grande has a much higher crime rate for both violent crime and property crimes than similarly populated cities in Arizona.

With a violent crime rate of 587.23 crimes per 100,000, Casa Grande exceeds both the national and state violent crime rate. Its rate is 75 percent higher than the next highest city in the exhibit, Prescott. Similarly, Casa Grande has a property crime rate nearly 72 percent higher than the next

highest city, Bullhead City. (Detailed on crime rates in Arizona can be found in Appendix A)

Notwithstanding the rate of crime, the sheer volume of crime is also important to point out. In 2009 Casa Grande experienced 254 violent crimes, or more than 100 more than the next highest city of similar size. The rate and volume of violent crime is an important variable to consider when evaluating the operations and efficiency of an agency’s investigative function. The data presented above make it very clear that not only is crime at a much higher rate in Casa Grande than other cities, but the investigators charged with solving those crimes need to be efficient and organized properly.

Exhibit 6 shows the workload and case clearance rate of CID investigators for FY2009-2010.

**Exhibit 6. CID Workload and Case Clearances, FY 2009-2010**

Investigator	# Cases Assigned	# of Cases Cleared	% of Cases Cleared	# of Cases Inactive	% of Cases Inactive	# of Cases Open
<b><u>GI</u></b>						
Deleon	94	48	51	11	12	17
Hange	72	6	8	35	49	7
Reyes	49	10	20	15	31	17
Rodriguez	81	15	19	20	25	28
Schmitz	91	13	14	48	53	20
Ybarra	47	20	43	11	23	15
TOTAL	434	112	26	140	32	104
<b><u>SEU</u></b>						
McCabe	55	28	51	15	27	9
McCloskey	76	52	61	10	13	5
TOTAL	131	80	61	25	19	14
<b><u>NARCS</u></b>						
	80	48	60			8

An examination of the data in the exhibit indicates that investigators in the CGPD are being assigned more than just violent crime cases. In 2009 there were 254 violent crimes reported and in FY2009-2010 there were 434 cases assigned. Although the time periods are different, assuming the cases are assigned proportionately throughout the year, the conclusion can be drawn that GIU investigates other crimes in addition to Part I violent offenses.

For FY2008-2009, GIU records indicate that 875 cases were assigned: 323 person (violent) crimes, 276 property crimes, 244 financial crimes, and 32 other cases. (The time periods used are different due to the different records generated by the CGPD for ICMA review. Ideally, similar time periods should be used, but the information provided is still useful for illustrative purposes. Data were not presented on FY2009-2010 assigned case categories.)

### *Case Management*

In general the CGPD does a good job of assigning and managing cases. When an active case is sent to the CID for investigation, the case is evaluated by the general investigations sergeant and assigned accordingly. Narcotics investigations are generated in a different process and subject to further discussion below. The cases are assigned based on a combination of current caseload, investigator specialization, and other relevant factors. The cases are managed through a computer-based system and the investigations sergeant can access the system and monitor the progress of a case at any time. This process is reported to be done monthly at a minimum and in actuality it occurs much more frequently.

In FY2009-2010 general investigators were assigned a total of 434 cases, or approximately 72 cases per investigator. Over the years of gathering statistical information while reviewing other police departments' benchmarks, we have found that the usual workload for an investigator is 80 to 120 cases per detective annually. Another industry benchmark for investigator staffing is to

evaluate it as a percentage of the personnel assigned to the patrol division. Typically, the number of investigative units is between ten to twelve percent of size of the patrol division. In the CGPD, there are forty-nine sworn officers in the patrol division. Thus, the number of investigators would be expected to be between 4.9 and 5.9, or roughly 5 to 6 investigators.

Based upon these analyses it would appear that the general investigations section of the CGPD has the appropriate number of investigators. Based on the volume of serious crime, however, and the need to supplement patrol resources, consideration should be given to expanding the number of investigators assigned to the GIU.

### **Recommendations:**

- i. The GIU must expand its hours of operation to times and days outside of conventional business hours. At a minimum, investigators need to work nights and weekends to respond to serious cases immediately. The current method of investigators being "on-call" is ineffective and must be changed.
- ii. The GIU sergeant must take a proactive and aggressive posture towards classifying cases as "inactive" based on generally accepted solvability criteria. This process needs to begin with reeducating the patrol division on inactivating cases in the field more readily and properly instructing complainant/victims about the reality of a "successful" resolution of their cases. Cases need to be triaged more aggressively to identify for investigation only those cases that have the potential to be solved. By screening cases more efficiently, investigators will have more time to dedicate to workable cases and detect and arrest a greater share of offenders.

- iii. In general, property crime cases should be classified as inactive unless there are extenuating circumstances that indicate the cases can be investigated and lead to a successful clearance.
- iv. The GIU sergeant must be evaluating cases, caseload, and case clearance rate weekly, at a minimum. The sergeant should also hold investigators accountable and not tolerate poor performance.

### *Clearance Rate*

The clearance rates shown in Exhibit 6 are problematic. In 2008, the Federal Bureau of Investigation reported that the national average clearance rate for violent crimes was 63.6 percent. Crimes of burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft were cleared 19.9 percent of the time. Overall, CGPD's GI Unit achieved a clearance rate of 26 percent. This figure is much lower than the national average.

The CGPD includes all cases referred to the general investigations unit, and does not calculate clearance rate based upon violent and property crime categories. Considering the distribution of UCR Part I Index Crime in Casa Grande during the period under observation, there appears to be an inordinate number of property crimes (burglary, theft, auto theft) compared to violent crimes (murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault). Violent crimes by their interpersonal nature lend themselves to a higher clearance rate. Therefore, a caseload made up of a large number of property crimes would naturally result in a lower clearance rate. So the low clearance rate reported by CGPD presumably reflects this. Nonetheless, it is a very low clearance rate in general and steps must be taken to improve the overall performance of this unit.

**Recommendation:** Administratively, cases should be separated and clearance rates calculated by type of case investigated. Aggregating cases leads to a lower reported clearance rate and the impression the GIU is under-performing.

From an operational perspective, and in keeping with other recommendations in this report, investigators must be utilized more effectively. Their hours of operation must be expanded, cases must be managed more efficiently, and investigators must be supervised and held accountable for their performance. An investigator who has a substandard clearance rate should be reassigned. Investigators with substandard clearance rates are either not being supervised, are not trained, or not competent to handle the position. Regardless of the reason, they are not effective. Investigators performing at this level are little more than administrative case managers and not police investigators.

#### *Follow-up and Victim Contact*

The community, including several members of the city council, is critical of the CGPD for not providing sufficient follow-up on cases. Several cases were cited where investigators failed to contact crime victims after incidents, leaving victims to believe that their cases were not being investigated properly. According to CGPD policy, investigators are required to contact a victim immediately and inform them that the case is under investigation, conduct an initial interview if not already done, and advise the complaint of investigatory steps that are being taken or contemplated. Inspection of case files indicated that the GIU created a victim notification form for this very purpose, and the forms capture information on the initial notification and when the cases is subsequently closed.

The Casa Grande community expects superior service from the CGPD and appears interested in maintaining a "small-town" philosophy with respect to public contact. As the patrol division is expected to respond to every call, no matter how minor, the CID is expected to provide a similar service to crime victims, and to treat them like neighbors and not simply cases and statistics. This is a valuable philosophy and one that represents the best of police strategy, but one often overlooked in the hustle and bustle of criminal

investigations. Follow-up can be more than just keeping victims "in the loop." Victim contact is a valuable way to solicit new information about the crime, offer crime prevention services, and demonstrate to the victim that something is being done about their case.

**Recommendation:** Complainant/victim follow-up is currently viewed as an administrative procedure. Like many things in the CGPD, it is a reaction to criticism from the city administration. Follow-up should be viewed as good investigatory work, good customer service, and an opportunity to solve a case or prevent future crime. It is recommended that a more robust follow-up process be implemented involving multiple levels of agency operations.

At a minimum, victims should be contacted immediately after a case is assigned, and weekly until the case is cleared or inactivated. The GIU sergeant should monitor case progress to ensure this is accomplished.

A follow-up system should also be instituted by the crime prevention officer. Contacting a victim after a crime can be an important opportunity to offer any crime prevention services that the CGPD offers.

The patrol division should also be involved in follow-up by conducting directed patrol and canvassing an area in the wake of a crime.

### *Intelligence/Crime Analysis*

According to the CGPD organizational chart (revised 1/14/2010) there are vacant positions for an intelligence detective and a crime analyst. In the absence of these positions, the CID is relying on the efforts of a civilian employee to generate crime information. Essentially no criminal intelligence or systematic crime analysis is being performed in the department.

The ICMA investigation revealed that crime maps are generated and distributed to patrol. This, however, is not an effective use of this valuable resource. Map

distribution is an important but passive step in the crime management process. Officers on patrol should know and understand the crime patterns in the community, but this is not enough. Coordinated and integrated operational planning needs to occur to transform the information into intelligence and a series of tactics and activities that can be executed by all facets of the organization. Patterns need to be identified, recidivists need to be identified and monitored, prisoners debriefed, locations identified, and so forth. There also seems to be a fundamental misunderstanding in the department of the value of information and the need to translate it into actionable intelligence. Creating an intelligence position and embracing the COMPSTAT model mentioned previously are important first steps that must be taken to manage crime in Casa Grande.

**Recommendation:** Consideration should be given to staffing these positions immediately. The absence of any concrete analysis of crime conditions, and the lack of strategic and tactical plans to address crime problems, is a major shortcoming of the CID and the CGPD. These positions are not a luxury of full deployment, but essential to the core mission of the department.

#### *Narcotics Unit*

The narcotics unit is currently staffed with one sergeant and two investigators. There is one vacancy in the unit and one vacant position on the regional task force. Review of narcotics unit operations reveals impressive activity for a unit of its size. The unit is involved in numerous long-term and short-term investigations and has been effective in making arrests and seizing property and money. Arrest statistics for the year are reported to be forty-four total arrests for the period ending 9/30/2010, which signify a long-term, case-driven approach to enforcement. Although the position on the regional task force is vacant, recent activity by the unit indicates that it is working in close cooperation with other jurisdictions to combat the drug trade in the area.

**Recommendations:** The vacant position in the narcotics unit should be filled as soon as practical. The unit's focus should also be directed to drug enforcement and investigations that are more narrowly connected to crime in Casa Grande. Given the alarmingly high incidence of property crime in Casa Grande, the narcotics unit must be instrumental in targeting the drug activity that drives this property crime. Research has demonstrated that a great deal of property crime is committed by persons addicted to drugs trying to support their habit. Undoubtedly, this dynamic is present in Casa Grande, and the narcotics unit needs to redouble its efforts to focus on this activity. Long-term investigations with a regional focus are appropriate, but a renewed emphasis on local conditions that drive property crime in the city is recommended. It is also recommended that the position on the regional task force be left unfilled.

#### *Special Enforcement Unit*

The special enforcement unit is staffed with one sergeant and two investigators, with two vacancies at present. The mission of the unit is to address a variety of criminal activity. Recently, the focus of the unit has shifted to property crime investigation and consideration is being given to changing the focus of the unit permanently to this function.

**Recommendation:** The special enforcement unit should not be tasked with conventional property crime investigations. This unit should be expanded and deployed in a proactive fashion to attack crime and the conditions that precipitate crime. It is recommended that this unit be staffed with at least four investigators and be used aggressively as a team to tackle the conditions that are driving a high crime rate in Casa Grande. This unit should focus on targeted enforcement of special groups (gangs, burglary crews, etc.) and special locations (night clubs/bars, hot-spots, etc.). In general, the SEU should be the enforcement arm of the CID and be directed in the field, and not assigned cases in the office.

Currently, the CID is operating understaffed and under the weight of a heavy workload. The division also lacks focus, in that there is no organizational expectation that anything needs to be done to impact the alarming rate of crime in the community. The fact that investigators all work weekday hours, and the resistance to change these hours; the low clearance rate; the lack of any intelligence gathering or analysis, and even the recognition of why this is necessary; have created a culture in which CID functions border on administrative.

The CID is a major area of police operations in the CGPD and should be given the resources and support to carry out its mission effectively. This division needs to organize around three core functions: long-term investigations, targeted enforcement, and criminal intelligence. The three activities work hand-in-glove and need to be managed in a coordinated and integrated manner. Good intelligence can drive investigations and targeted enforcement, targeted enforcement can develop leads to solve cases, and also gather intelligence to guide future activity. Like three stands of a rope, all three functions need to be strong to make the CID strong.

Fully staffing both a special enforcement unit and a narcotics unit will provide the resources to conduct proactive enforcement on crime conditions. Establishing a robust criminal intelligence and crime analysis function will allow the division to develop and manage information better and use it to tackle crime. And better case management and broader deployment of investigators will give the GIU the ability to investigate cases that can be solved. Work shifts scheduled during the times when investigators are needed the most will increase their ability to solve those cases.

## **D. Organizational Communications**

Communications within the organization and external communications from the CGPD to other entities is dysfunctional. This situation is so serious it is paralyzing operations and rendering the entire organization ineffective. The chief and the command staff recognize this problem, as does the rank and file. It is the 800-pound gorilla in the room and an issue that needs to be corrected immediately.

On numerous occasions it was related to ICMA that there are concerns regarding chain of command, wherein individuals are constantly circumventing authority. The "chain of command" issue involves serious breaches in communication within rank in the CGPD, and a breakdown in organizational communication with city government.

As discussed previously, the ICMA team was made aware of a substantial "log-jam" in the policy development process. It was also reported by numerous members of the CGPD that the city administration is demanding that all policies being considered for implementation in the CGPD be vetted by the city administration beforehand. The combination of these two factors is creating a perception by the rank and file that the CGPD command staff can get nothing done, and is creating apathy on the part of the command staff because nothing can be done without the imprimatur of the city administration. The real-world product of this situation is a lack of confidence in the leadership of the CGPD to either entertain issues on behalf of the organization or actually have the ability to do anything about those issues, and the creation of organizational malaise.

At all levels of the organization, officers were able to cite examples of policies that need to be developed and implemented, but were stalled for years. According to a member of the command staff, "We've lost control of our own Department!" It also was reported that staff meetings are reduced

to discussing the same items over and over again because there is little or no movement on issues. ICMA staff requested agendas and minutes of staff meetings and was given such documents. However, it was reported that those documents were fabricated for ICMA. It was alleged that there are no agendas, no minutes, and no direction because the organization is mired in inaction. The documents delivered to ICMA were allegedly created to satisfy the request for such documents and were in no way the product of any meetings.

This is not an indictment of oversight by the city administration over the CGPD. It is the administration's duty to provide oversight and review of the department. However, the protracted delays are negatively impacting the sound operation of the CGPD and contributing to a climate of indecision. The command staff perceives themselves to be "handcuffed" and unable to implement policies independently. This perception seems to be bleeding into the decision-making ability in general and the perception is created that the command staff won't make, or is incapable of making, any decisions. This perception is borne out by responses to the employee survey. In general, respondents report that they lack confidence in the chief, the deputy chief, and the command staff. Respondents also report general agreement with the statement "It seems like no one is in charge."

This condition also inhibits the ability of the organization to evolve. The Casa Grande community is growing rapidly, and the CGPD must be nimble enough to adapt to this growth. A stagnant policy process is inhibiting the CGPD's ability to respond to the growing demands of the community.

This sentiment was reported on numerous meetings with officers at all levels of the CGPD. The charge was echoed over and over that "there is no vision" and "there is no plan" for the CGPD. This sentiment is also evident from the survey responses. Respondents report general disagreement with the

statements “the department has a clear sense of its mission,” “the department is innovative when it comes to fighting crime,” “the department is innovative when it comes to dealing with the community,” and “the command staff does a good job communicating its decisions to everyone.” The ICMA investigation reveals that there is little in the way of strategic planning, either for the entire organization, or for crime-specific issues. There was also a strong sentiment that things are “stuck” in time with the prevailing philosophy of “that’s the way we’ve always done things” governing operations and management. Clearly, the CGPD needs to be more nimble, more strategic, and more responsive to the community developing around it.

The ability to be nimble relies on progressive, innovative, and responsive leadership. The command staff of the organization is perceived to be unable to live up to this expectation. While the organizational “malaise” reported earlier can be attributed to many causes, in addition to the policy log-jam, one such cause may be the capabilities of the command staff.

The command staff of the CGPD is made up of experienced and dedicated professionals. With the exception of the deputy chief, however, they collectively lack advanced education and are relying solely on their experiences in the CGPD to manage the agency. This lack of educational experience could be a contributing factor in the inability of the CGPD to successfully embrace a vision and a direction that would permit the organization to evolve with the community. It is strongly recommended that the command staff of the CGPD receive training and education in contemporary management and leadership and use this education to develop their own abilities and the abilities of their subordinates.

In addition to the dysfunctional organizational communication cited above, there is also serious issue with respect to communicating within the chain of command.

It was disclosed to ICMA that elected government officials are currently assigned as volunteers in the CGPD. Involvement with the police and active participation in civic affairs are the hallmarks of good citizenship. However, in this instance there appears to be a significant conflict of interest where the direct participation of elected officials in the affairs and operations of the CGPD are directly impacting the organization's ability to operate effectively. There appears to be a blurring of the volunteer role and the role of the elected official (the former is community service and the latter is oversight). This situation must be ended immediately and individuals should be permitted to be either CGPD volunteers, or elected officials, but not both simultaneously.

Numerous instances were reported where officers felt entitled to go outside the chain of command to communicate grievances directly with the city administration and elected officials. For example, the CGPD was directed to reduce spending and cut back on non-essential purchases. As part of this expense reduction effort, certain uniform items were not purchased for a specialized unit in the patrol division. The exact dynamics of the communication are unknown, but a member of the CGPD impacted by this expense reduction (uniform item not purchased) communicated this directly to the city administration. The city administration then directed the chief to purchase the items in question, after the chief's decision NOT to purchase the uniform item due to the spending directive. While this is a seemingly minor example, the cumulative impact of these types of episodes is to stifle the decision-making ability of the chief and command staff.

In general, officers feel comfortable with, or at least are not dissuaded from, communicating directly with city and elected officials. Recent discipline of a CGPD officer for communicating in such a fashion was met by criticism by the city government for "punishing the messenger." Communicating with an elected official or outside organization about official policies or operations of the CGPD should be strictly prohibited unless permission is given by the Chief of Police. Otherwise, the authority and decision-making ability of the chief and the entire command staff of the CGPD is undermined.

In addition, certain individuals are putting their own spin on issues, instead of performing in a professional manner and reporting the facts. As a substitute, everyone says, "We need to do this because the city manager, the mayor, the governing body and or the chief of police want us to do it." This attitude undermines the authority of government. The mayor, members of the governing body, city manager, chief of police, and members of the police department should be held strictly accountable for these actions. The city should establish a strict policy regarding anyone who violates the proper chain of command.

This situation is compounded by the CGPD's inability to implement policies expeditiously. Organizations have momentum and this momentum leads to action. When this action is inhibited it naturally seeks an outlet. When officers, therefore, cannot get necessary changes through the traditional organizational policy process (because it is stagnant), they seek relief and assistance through other means (because there is an understanding that actors outside the CGPD with the power to effectuate change will do something about the issue). This puts the chief and the command staff in an untenable situation. Issues are stalled and officers can bring issues directly to city government for resolution. The situation has created indecision, a culture of leadership apathy, and inhibits needed change.

In fairness to both sides involved in this dilemma, it is difficult to see which came first. Was it ineffective management in the CGPD that required stricter oversight, or was it tighter control by the city administration that produced indecisiveness in the CGPD? While the cause is unclear, the results are clear: an organization that seems to be without leadership, without a clear sense of direction, and an organization suffering from an overall sense of "malaise."

### **Recommendations:**

- i. Give proper authority and accountability to the Chief of Police. Empower the chief to lead the CGPD and hold him accountable for performance. Let the chief "be the chief." If he is thought not to be capable of that responsibility, or fails in that responsibility, replace him.
- ii. Prohibit elected officials from acting in any capacity with the operation of the CGPD.
- iii. Implement a strict confidentiality policy prohibiting official communication by members of the CGPD to and with entities outside the CGPD without prior approval from the chief.
- iv. Develop and implement a robust leadership development program and require continuing education for all supervisory and command positions.

## **E. Miscellaneous**

### *Community Relations*

ICMA was particularly impressed by the close interaction between the police department and community volunteers. The volunteers assist with many daily functions for the police department. In 2008 the volunteers worked 8,263 hours and in 2009 they worked 11,968 hours.

Volunteers in these programs do the following:

- *Citizens on Patrol*: Assist patrol with traffic control, various command post callouts, speed trailers, missing person searches, catastrophic events/natural disasters (e.g., power outages), special events, and support of officers in long-term emergencies (providing meals/drinks, acting as runners for paperwork or other materials). Volunteers have specific vehicles assigned to them, which say "City of Casa Grande Volunteer."
- *Crisis Response Unit*: Are called to relieve officers at scenes and assist in emergencies, including deaths and serious injuries.
- *Speed Limit Enforcement*: Help reduce the incidence of speeding vehicles by using radar speed trailers.
- *Surveillance Camera Operators*: Maintain, deploy, and retrieve surveillance cameras used in department operations.
- *Block Watch Program Volunteers*: Assist the crime prevention officer in managing and expanding the block watch program.
- *Volunteer Crime Free Multi-Housing Program*: Assist the crime prevention officer in managing and expanding the Crime-Free Multi-Housing Program.
- *Personal Assistance Dialer Installer*: Keep senior citizens safe by providing devices to enable emergency response in case of injury or illness.

- Senior Phone Patrol: Make a personal telephone contact daily with every senior citizen and homebound person on the maintained contact list.
- Emergency Access Program: Provide access to residents in response to emergency calls.
- Fingerprint Technician: Help the CGPD fingerprint citizens on scheduled Tuesdays and Thursdays.
- Administration Data Entry: Work in the records division entering information from reports into the CRIMES program.
- Maintenance: Help maintain the bicycle fleet and building.
- Crime Prevention Aide: Assist a crime prevention officer in serving the needs of the community
- TRAID: Solicit and collect cell phones for seniors in the area so they can call 911 in an emergency.
- Retired Senior Volunteer Program: Program for individuals who are 55 years and older.

Many police agencies publically promote the concept of community policing with little actual substance. It is clear that the CGPD has a true partnership with the community that is integral to the agency's strategy.

**Recommendation:** Consideration should be given to supplement the crime prevention officer position with additional sworn personnel. Adding a second crime prevention officer or a full-time community affairs officer will bolster the community relations component of the CGPD. It would also fit nicely into overall crime reduction strategies. The physical and social organization of the Casa Grande residential community makes such a position valuable. Interacting with the various homeowners associations and security professionals and helping them prevent crime in the community is a critical resource and one that needs to be supported.

## **F. Communications Center**

The basic function of the communication system is to satisfy the immediate information needs of the CGPD in the course of normal daily activities and during emergencies. The communications system conveys information from the public to the CGPD through communications personnel, to the officer who responds to the call for assistance, to other law enforcement and public service agencies, and to information storage facilities and retrieval systems.

Most routine communications and all emergency communications are routed through the communications center. There are three interrelated means of communication in place: telephone, radio, and computer. All services demand immediate attention, forcing a dispatcher to choose one call over the other. The communications center console positions are capable of receiving telephone calls and dispatching.

CGPD civilian dispatchers demonstrate a high degree of professionalism when interacting with police officers on the radio and interacting with the citizens over the phone. The communications center is secure from the public.

The communications center is inadequate, however, and the civilian dispatchers are working under adverse conditions. Fortunately, the facility is scheduled for an update.

While the dispatchers assigned to the unit appear to be professionally trained, ICMA questions the exacerbated dispatch times that the department experiences. The cause of this may be ineffective equipment, or the dispatch center may be holding the CFS too long before dispatching. This situation is illustrated in Tables 11, 12, and 14 in the Data Analysis section of this report.

The communications center is also responsible for managing the computer-aided dispatch/records management system (CAD/RMS).

The CAD system tracks the time calls are received, time to dispatch, response time to arrival, and time on scene. Generally speaking, the officer clears the call when he clears the scene. CGPD tracks report writing time; however, this information is entered as a generic class code for total report writing and is not specific to the call.

In addition, the CAD does not provide real-time crime trends for daily briefing. Standard report programs could be added which could produce those trend reports from the CAD information now being stored in the system. The CAD system needs to be updated and managed better. To accomplish this, the city and police administration must explore the possibility of a dedicated full- or part-time information technology employee assigned to the CGPD.

## **G. Facility, Vehicles, and Equipment**

### *Facility*

The department's existing building is being replaced and the CGPD will be moving into its new facility in December 2010. Communications will remain at the existing facility, so the 911 center will not be moving. ICMA commends both the city and the police administration for their vision and keen insight regarding to these facilities.

During ICMA visits, we observed some concerns with the existing workspace and storage issues. Police administration reiterated these concerns with workspace and the storage of property and evidence. There is an adage in law enforcement that "a police facility is a tool, not just a shelter."

### *Vehicles*

Police vehicles appear maintained, clean, and properly marked for visibility and safety. The CGPD has followed an established fleet history by purchasing Ford Crown Victoria vehicles. The city fleet manager is happy with the Ford product, as are the officers. CGPD is aware that Ford will no longer offer the Crown Victoria in the coming years, and they have been following the information presented on the Taurus platform.

### **Recommendation:**

The responsibility for the fleet should remain with the city fleet manager; however, the city administration should perform cursory reviews on future CGPD vehicle selections. The fleet manager should also continue to provide gas consumption reports to the police administration so they can be more mindful of the operating budget, fuel consumption, and actual fuel costs.

## H. Employee Survey

ICMA administered a self-directed, web-based survey that was open to all sworn members of the CGPD. The survey consisted of forty-seven statements exploring five general categories: work conditions, communication, meaningful work, support/relationships, and general topics. The statements were structured using a 6-point Likert scale that ranged from strongly agree to strongly disagree. Responses were coded numerically (1-strongly agree, 2-agree, 3-somewhat agree, 4-somewhat disagree, 5-disagree, and 6-strongly disagree).

Responses to each statement were tabulated and an average score was computed. Employees could also submit comments if they desired. Since ICMA has no way of verifying the veracity of many of the comments, we have provided them in a separate document to the City identified as Appendix C. We do believe that many of these comments provide valuable insight into the internal issues facing the department.

The survey was loaded on the web-based survey site "Survey Monkey" and all sworn officers were sent an e-mail with the link to the website and instructions on how to complete the survey. Officers were given five days (October 5–9, 2010) to access and complete the survey.

In total 54 responses were received, resulting in 53 valid, completed surveys. This represents a 71.1 percent return rate with a margin of error of +/- 7.2 percent.<sup>1</sup> From a practical perspective this means that the survey results are representative of the CGPD within 7 percentage points. What does this mean? For example, the response average to the first statement "I believe the CGPD provides an excellent service to the community of Casa

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<sup>1</sup> Margin of error, or confidence interval, was calculated by the website <http://www.surveysystem.com/sscalc.htm>. The variables under consideration are confidence level (95%), population size (76), and a probability of diversity (.50).

Grande” was 2.60. Due to the margin of error, this rating could range from 2.79 to 2.41, or 7.2 percent above and below 2.60.

The representativeness of the sample, therefore, rests on this confidence interval. Considering that survey responses were supported by personal observations and reports from the officers themselves, ICMA has a high degree of confidence in the survey results as accurately describing the conditions present in the CGPD. The following is a discussion of the strengths and weakness of the CGPD that the survey reveals. The full results of the survey, including open-ended comments, can be found in Appendix B.

### *Strengths/Positives*

Survey results indicate several positive indicators of work conditions in the CGPD. There is a great sense of pride in the department expressed by survey respondents. The statement “I am proud to be a member of the CGPD” received the highest positive score, with a rating average of 2.15 (out of 6), which indicates general agreement. The second highest score was to the statement “I am satisfied with my work schedule,” at 2.27, which can be supported by high disapproval of the statement pertaining to switching to 12-hour shifts (rating = 4.87). In general, the survey indicates a positive work environment with clear expectations, supervisory support, and broad-based satisfaction with the CGPD as a place of employment and policing as a career. Similarly, there are no general deficiencies noted with the equipment.

### *Weakness/Negatives*

The survey revealed numerous weaknesses/negatives. With average scores of 4.73, 4.58, 4.60, and 4.75, there is clear dissatisfaction with the way specialized assignments are made and the administration of the disciplinary system. These scores indicate that respondents report disagreement with

the statements "specialized assignments are based on competency," "selection to specialized assignments is done fairly," "discipline is applied fairly," and "discipline is applied consistently." Although these topics are the subject of other sections of the report, it bears repeating that these areas of administration in the CGPD need immediate attention and correction.

Likewise, communication in the CGPD and between the department and city hall is rated negatively. Respondents report high levels of disagreement with the statements relating to the effectiveness of communication in these areas.

Similarly, and as pointed out in other areas of this report, there appears to be a general lack of confidence in the leadership of the CGPD. Respondents are in disagreement with the statements "I have confidence in Chief Huddleston to lead the department" (score of 4.00), "I have confidence in Deputy Chief Daniel to lead the department" (score of 4.53), and "I have confidence in the command staff to lead the department" (score of 4.39). Also, respondents disagree with the statements regarding innovation within the department. This finding supports the notion that the CGPD is not effective at responding to crime and community problems, and in general is not evolving as the community grows, evolves, and changes.

The stress placed on the patrol division to respond to CFS was a major topic of an earlier section of this report. The conclusions and the recommendations in that section are supported by the survey results.

According to the survey, respondents had the strongest level of disagreement with the following statements: "Patrol units have plenty of time to interact with the community" (score of 4.87), and "Patrol units have plenty of time to address crime and quality of life issues" (score of 4.90). Also, the statement "There need to be more officers on patrol to handle the workload" scored a 1.60, which is the highest level of agreement in the

survey. The responses to these three statements lend support to the notion that the patrol division has a tremendous workload and is almost completely reactive in its operations.

## **J. Additional Observations and Recommendations**

### *Civilianization*

The CGPD, like most police departments, is confronting increasing demands for services with limited resources. One remedy for the dilemma is the greater use of civilian employees. Civilianization enables more officers to answer calls requiring full police powers.

**Recommendation:** The city and police administrations should identify civilian positions (for example, a civilian assistant to the chief of police, records management assistant, crime analysis/planner, property and evidence manager, and control and crime scene identification/processing technicians) to assist the department.

### *Police and Fire Quality-of-Life Issues*

During ICMA's site visits, we noticed that there were many quality-of-life codification issues that are not being enforced. While the city has taken aggressive steps to curtail these issues, it is labor intensive for the existing code enforcement and inspection personnel.

There are various times during the fire department's tours of duty that they can provide assistance when the city's code enforcement personnel or the police department's resources are absolutely drained. The fire department could play more of an active role in assisting the code enforcement and police department's personnel with inspections and enforcement.

**Recommendation:** The city, police, and fire administrations should collectively develop a plan in which fire personnel will be more proactive in producing a zero tolerance/enforcement policy for quality-of-life ordinances directly affecting in the community.

### *Alarms*

False alarm issues are faced by all law enforcement agencies. Nationally, "police response to burglar alarms constitute 10 to 20 percent of all police calls, but 94 to 99 percent of these alarms are false. In 2000, total national cost for responding to 36 million false burglar alarms was \$1.8 billion. If the alarm problem did not exist, at least 35,000 officers could be shifted to other duties" (*FBI National Academy Associate*, July/August, Volume 7, Number 4, 2005).

In 2008, there were 1,782 police burglary alarm events reported to the CGPD. On most occasions, two police officers should be responding to alarms. Using the CGPD CFS time analysis per call (18.6 minutes), this equates to 1,104 staffing hours for police officers. At the present time, a \$10 fee is charged and collected for the registration of an alarm. CGPD is presently working on a software program that will automate much of the license renewals, false alarm notices, and invoices for violation fees. The police administration advises that the program should be running in 60 to 90 days. Alarm education classes will start with the major violators in the near future.

ICMA commends the police administration for its efforts in streamlining this aspect of policing, as false alarms can result in a serious loss of police and fire personnel time.

The city can inform both commercial and residential establishments of its intention to enforce the progressive ordinance by placing a notice with the tax bills.

**Recommendation:** While the city may be hesitant to strictly enforce an alarm ordinance, the implementation of an updated alarm ordinance is not an issue about collecting fees. Rather, it is done to emphasize to both the city and the police administrations, and especially the residents, the lost productivity associated with non-enforcement.

### *Records Management*

All police agencies have some level of records management—even if only to support the personnel function. There are basic standards that must exist and be adhered to, thereby ensuring a quality system.

CALEA has established a series of standards in the area of records. The standards are basic to meeting the management, operational, and information needs of the agency; however, it is not the intent of this reference to detail the CALEA standards. The standards, which are readily available from numerous resources, are considered good record management practices based on nationally accepted baseline indicators of quality.

The records provide a service to citizens, the CGPD, law enforcement entities, and other agencies that provide service to the residents. The system is supposed to convey information from the public to the department's record management system so that data can be entered and retrieved.

ICMA found that records management personnel were qualified, were skilled, and addressed the public in a customer-friendly, service-oriented manner.

**Recommendation:** ICMA commends the records personnel for their professionalism; however, more robust information technology and support are necessary to ensure security and integrity of the records management system.

## **IV. Data Analysis**

### **A. Introduction**

In this analysis we focus on three main areas: workload, deployment, and response times. These three areas are almost exclusively related to patrol operations, which constitute by far the bulk of the police department's personnel and financial commitment.

All information in this analysis was developed directly from data recorded in the department's dispatch center. The purpose of this report is to provide the city with our findings.

The majority of the first section of this analysis, concluding with Table 8, uses the call and activity data for the entire year from September 1, 2008, through August 31, 2009. For the detailed workload analysis and the response-time analysis, we used two four-week sample periods. The first period was the month of February 2009 (February 1 to February 28), or *winter*, and the second period was the month of August 2009 (August 1 to August 28), or *summer*.

## B. Workload Analysis

Data management and accuracy are crucial and always must be reviewed before proceeding with an in-depth statistical analysis. As with similar cases around the country, we encountered a number of issues when analyzing the data supplied by the police department. We made assumptions and decisions to address them. We describe these issues, assumptions, and decisions below.

- A small but significant percentage (6 percent) of calls involving patrol units had zero time on scene.
- The computer software in use generates a large number of call codes. This led to 117 different call descriptions, which we reduced to sixteen categories for tables and ten categories for figures.

Our study team has worked with many of these problems with CFS data in previous studies. To identify calls that were canceled en route, we assumed zero time on scene to account for a significant portion of them. Any call with an on-scene time of less than thirty seconds was labeled *zero on scene*. We also used the information stored within the dispatch records (PD Call Master Source) to distinguish between patrol-initiated (also called *self-initiated*) and other-initiated calls.

In the period from September 2008 to August 2009 there were approximately 105,500 calls for service. Roughly 101,500 of these calls included a patrol unit as either the primary responder or a secondary unit. For the four-week sample periods, we analyzed 7,870 (patrol-related) calls in February 2009 and 7,389 (patrol-related) calls in August 2009. In addition, when analyzing workloads and response times, we ignored calls with incorrect or missing time data. The inaccuracies included elapsed times

that either were negative or exceeded eight hours. For the entire year, we excluded fewer than 600 calls from our analysis.

In the period from September 2008 to August 2009 the police department reported an average of 278 calls for service per day. As mentioned, about 6 percent of these calls (average of eighteen per day) showed no officer time spent on the call.


In the following analysis we show two types of data: activity and workload. The activity levels are measured by the average number of calls per day, broken down by the type and origin of the calls and categorized by the nature of the calls (e.g., crime, traffic). Workloads are measured in average work-hours per day.

We used up to sixteen call categories for tables and up to ten call categories for figures. These call categories are shown on the next page. The category that was not used in this report is shown in *italics*.

The call categories we use to illustrate activity and workload are:

<b>Table categories</b>	<b>Figure categories</b>
Accidents	Traffic
Traffic enforcement	
Alarm	Investigations
Check/investigation	
Animal calls	General non-criminal
Miscellaneous	
Assist other agency	Assist other agency
Crime—persons	Crime
Crime—property	
Directed patrol	Directed patrol
Disturbance	Suspicious incident
Suspicious person/vehicle	
Juvenile	Juvenile
Out of service—administrative	Out of service
Out of service—personal	
Prisoner—arrest	Arrest
<i>Prisoner—transport</i>	

**Figure 1. Percentage Calls per Day, by Initiator**



Note: Percentages are based on a total of 101,482 calls.


**Table 1. Calls per Day, by Initiator**

Initiator	Total calls	Calls per day
Zero on-scene	6,497	17.8
Police initiated	68,264	187.0
Other initiated	26,721	73.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>101,482</b>	<b>278.0</b>

Observations:

- Six percent of calls have zero on-scene time and are included in these numbers as well as the next figure and table. Later, we exclude calls with zero on-scene time.
- More than two-thirds of all calls (67 percent) were police initiated.
- There was a total of 278 calls per day, or 11.6 per hour.

**Figure 2. Percentage Calls per Day, by Category**




**Table 2. Calls per Day, by Category**

Category	Total calls	Calls per day
Accidents	1,274	3.5
Alarm	2,164	5.9
Animal calls	743	2.0
Assist other agency	1,037	2.8
Check/investigation	22,336	61.2
Crime—persons	1,619	4.4
Crime—property	5,930	16.2
Directed patrol	2,488	6.8
Disturbance	3,715	10.2
Juvenile	1,044	2.9
Miscellaneous	7,421	20.3
Out of service—administrative	16,786	46.0
Out of service—personal	8,561	23.5
Prisoner—arrest	385	1.1
Suspicious person/vehicle	9,676	26.5
Traffic enforcement	16,303	44.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>101,482</b>	<b>278.0</b>

Observations:

- The top three categories (out of service, investigations, and traffic) accounted for 66 percent of activities.
- 25 percent of calls involved out-of-service activities (administrative and personal duties).
- 24 percent of calls involved investigations (checks and alarms).
- 17 percent of calls were traffic related (accidents and traffic enforcements).
- 13 percent of calls involved suspicious incidents.

**Figure 3. Percentage Nonzero In-Service Calls per Day, by Category**




**Table 3. Nonzero In-Service Calls per Day, by Category**

<b>Category</b>	<b>Total calls</b>	<b>Calls per day</b>
Accidents	1,196	3.3
Alarm	1,807	5.0
Animal calls	612	1.7
Assist other agency	897	2.5
Check/investigation	20,422	56.0
Crime—persons	1,459	4.0
Crime—property	5,327	14.6
Directed patrol	2,333	6.4
Disturbance	3,547	9.7
Juvenile	949	2.6
Miscellaneous	6,469	17.7
Prisoner—arrest	345	0.9
Suspicious person/vehicle	9,023	24.7
Traffic enforcement	15,919	43.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>70,305</b>	<b>192.6</b>

**Observations:**

- When calls with zero time on scene and out-of-service records were excluded, there were about 193 calls per day, or 8.0 per hour.
- Three categories (investigations, traffic, and suspicious incidents) accounted for 74 percent of calls.
- 32 percent of calls were investigations (checks and alarms).
- 24 percent of calls were traffic-related incidents (enforcement and accidents).
- 18 percent of calls involved suspicious activities.
- 10 percent of calls were crime related.

**Figure 4. Calls per Day, by Initiator and Two-Month Period**




**Table 4. Average Calls per Day, by Initiator and Two-Month Period**

Initiator	Sept.-Oct.	Nov.-Dec.	Jan.-Feb.	Mar.-Apr.	May-June	July-Aug.
Zero on scene	16.3	15.7	15.3	18.5	24.9	16.2
Police initiated	186.5	193.5	202.7	188.9	177.1	174.2
Other initiated	75.9	72.7	71.5	75	77.1	67.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>278.6</b>	<b>281.9</b>	<b>289.5</b>	<b>282.3</b>	<b>279.1</b>	<b>257.5</b>

#### Observations:

- The number of calls was least in July - August 2009.
- The number of calls was greatest in January - February 2009.
- The busiest two-month period had 12 percent more calls than the least busy two-month period.
- When focusing on police-initiated calls, we note that the period of January - February 2009 had 16 percent more of these calls than the period of July - August 2009.
- When focusing on other-initiated calls, we note that the period of May - June 2009 had 15 percent more of these calls than the period of July - August 2009.

**Figure 5. Calls per Day, by Category and Two-Month Period**




**Table 5. Calls per Day, by Category and Two-Month Period**

<b>Category</b>	<b>Sept.- Oct.</b>	<b>Nov.- Dec.</b>	<b>Jan.- Feb.</b>	<b>March- April</b>	<b>May- June</b>	<b>July- Aug.</b>
Accidents	3.8	4.2	3.5	3.5	2.7	3.3
Alarm	6.6	5.4	4.9	5.8	6.0	6.8
Animal calls	2.2	2.0	2.1	1.8	2.2	1.9
Assist other agency	2.5	2.8	2.6	3.2	2.8	3.1
Check/investigation	53.1	61.8	61.8	61.9	70.2	58.5
Crime—persons	4.3	4.9	4.0	4.6	4.6	4.2
Crime—property	18.8	17.5	15.4	15.1	16.3	14.5
Directed patrol	8.0	7.1	7.5	8.5	5.0	4.9
Disturbance	9.6	9.7	10.6	10.4	10.8	9.9
Juvenile	3.4	2.8	3.4	2.9	2.8	1.9
Miscellaneous	20.6	20.8	20.6	20.7	19.4	20.0
Out of service—administrative	45.4	47.6	48.5	47.0	43.9	43.7
Out of service—personal	22.7	24.2	25.0	24.0	22.5	22.4
Prisoner—arrest	0.7	0.9	0.9	1.2	1.4	1.2
Suspicious person/vehicle	29.9	24.1	25.6	28.8	27.3	23.4
Traffic enforcement	47.1	46.2	52.9	43.0	41.2	38.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>278.6</b>	<b>281.9</b>	<b>289.5</b>	<b>282.3</b>	<b>279.1</b>	<b>257.5</b>

Observations:

- Out-of-service calls and investigations were the most common types of activities throughout the year, averaging from 46 to 51 percent of all calls per day.
- Out-of-service (administrative and personal) calls averaged between 66 and 74 per day throughout the year.
- Investigations (alarms and checks) calls averaged between 60 and 76 per day throughout the year.
- Crime calls varied between 19 and 23 per day throughout the year. This accounted for 7 to 8 percent of daily calls.

**Figure 6. Average Occupied Times, by Category and Initiator**



**Table 6. Primary Unit's Average Occupied Times, by Category and Initiator**

Category	Police initiated		Other initiated	
	Total calls	Minutes	Total calls	Minutes
Accidents	57	38.1	1,138	50.6
Alarm	25	11.8	1,782	18.6
Animal calls	23	31.6	589	21.0
Assist other agency	148	43.9	748	36.0
Check/investigation	15,916	39.8	4,289	21.6
Crime—persons	49	40.4	1,410	44.2
Crime—property	155	36.4	5,170	42.0
Directed patrol	2,106	15.9	223	16.0
Disturbance	76	26.6	3,471	35.1
Juvenile	27	49.6	921	43.4
Miscellaneous	5,518	23.5	950	26.0
Prisoner—arrest	136	46.3	208	51.7
Suspicious person/vehicle	4,664	16.5	4,356	27.4
Traffic enforcement	15,075	15.8	831	24.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>43,975</b>	<b>25.9</b>	<b>26,086</b>	<b>32.3</b>


Note. Figure 6 and Table 6 exclude zero on-scene and out-of-service calls.



## Observations:

- A unit's occupied time is measured as the time from when it is dispatched until it next becomes available.
- The times shown are the average occupied times per call for the primary unit, rather than the total occupied time for all units assigned to a call.
- A unit's average time spent on a call ranged from 12 to 52 minutes overall, depending on call type.
- The longest average times spent were on calls involving prisoner arrests.
- Police-initiated traffic-related calls (traffic enforcement and accidents) averaged 16 minutes per call, whereas other-initiated traffic calls averaged 40 minutes.
- Crime calls averaged 37 minutes for police-initiated calls and 42 minutes for other-initiated calls.
- Check/investigation calls averaged 40 minutes for police-initiated calls and 22 minutes for other-initiated calls.


**Figure 7. Average Number of Responding Units, by Initiator and Category**



**Table 7. Average Number of Responding Units, by Initiator and Category**

Category	Police initiated		Other initiated	
	Average	Total calls	Average	Total calls
Accidents	2.0	57	2.1	1,139
Alarm	1.5	25	1.8	1,782
Animal calls	1.1	23	1.1	589
Assist other agency	1.3	148	1.6	749
Check/investigation	1.2	16,133	1.4	4,289
Crime—persons	1.6	49	1.8	1,410
Crime—property	1.3	155	1.4	5,172
Directed patrol	1.0	2,110	1.2	223
Disturbance	1.9	76	2.3	3,471
Juvenile	1.6	27	1.5	922
Miscellaneous	1.0	5,519	1.2	950
Suspicious person/vehicle	1.4	4,666	1.7	4,357
Prisoner—arrest	1.8	136	1.8	209
Traffic enforcement	1.2	15,088	1.5	831
<b>Total</b>	<b>1.2</b>	<b>44,035</b>	<b>1.6</b>	<b>26,093</b>

**Figure 8. Number of Responding Units, by Category**



**Table 8. Number of Responding Units, by Category**


Category	Responding units		
	One	Two	Three or more
Accidents	460	306	373
Alarm	743	785	254
Animal calls	525	51	13
Assist other agency	440	199	110
Check/investigation	3,144	810	335
Crime—persons	749	355	306
Crime—property	3,824	857	491
Directed patrol	189	25	9
Disturbance	662	1,577	1,232
Juvenile	584	245	93
Miscellaneous	812	116	22
Prisoner—arrest	77	107	25
Suspicious person/vehicle	2,249	1,448	660
Traffic enforcement	575	149	107
<b>Total</b>	<b>15,033</b>	<b>7,030</b>	<b>4,030</b>

Note. Figure 8 and Table 8 consider only other-initiated in-service calls.

## Observations:

- The overall mean number of responding units was 1.2 for police-initiated calls and 1.6 for other-initiated calls.
- The mean number of responding units was a maximum of 2.3 for other-initiated calls involving disturbances.
- Most other-initiated calls (58 percent) involved one responding unit.
- 15 percent of all other-initiated calls involved three or more units.
- The largest group of calls with three or more responding units involved suspicious incidents and disturbances. This combined category accounted for almost half of the calls with three or more responding units.

**Figure 9. Percentage Calls and Work-Hours, by Category, February 2009**



Note. Calculations include only nonzero on-scene in-service calls.


**Table 9. Calls and Work-Hours per Day, by Category, February 2009**

Category	Per day	
	Calls	Work-hours
Arrest	1.1	1.1
Assist other agency	2.8	2.4
Crime	16.2	14.0
Directed patrol	5.9	1.5
General non-criminal	18.5	7.2
Investigations	63.6	50.8
Juvenile	3.2	2.6
Suspicious incident	33.9	22.5
Traffic	49.8	24.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>194.9</b>	<b>126.6</b>

## Observations:

- On average there were 195 calls per day in February, or 8.1 per hour.
- Average workload was 127 work-hours per day, meaning that an average of 5.3 personnel per hour were busy responding to calls.
- Investigations constituted 33 percent of calls and 40 percent of workload.
- Traffic-related events constituted 26 percent of calls and 19 percent of workload.
- Crimes constituted 8 percent of calls and 11 percent of workload.

**Figure 10. Percentage Calls and Work-Hours, by Category, August 2009**



Note. Calculations include only nonzero on-scene in-service calls.

**Table 10. Calls and Work-Hours per Day, by Category, August 2009**

Category	Per day	
	Calls	Work-hours
Arrest	1.0	1.6
Assist other agency	2.5	2.6
Crime	17.5	14.8
Directed patrol	5.0	1.9
General non-criminal	19.8	8.6
Investigations	60.8	47.6
Juvenile	2.0	2.2
Suspicious incident	28.4	20.9
Traffic	41.5	17.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>178.5</b>	<b>117.9</b>

## Observations:

- In August the total calls and workload were lower than in February.
- On average, there were 179 calls per day in August or 7.5 per hour, which was 8 percent lower than the number of calls in February.
- Average workload was 118 work-hours per day, or 4.9 personnel per hour, which was 7 percent lower than the workload in February.
- Traffic-related events constituted 23 percent of calls and 15 percent of workload.
- Investigations constituted 34 percent of calls and 40 percent of workload, which was similar to that in February.
- Crimes constituted 10 percent of calls and 13 percent of workload.


## **C. Deployment**

The police department's patrol force operates on three 10-hour shifts starting at 7 a.m., 4 p.m. or 4:30 p.m., and 9:30 p.m.


Within the patrol unit, we included both officers and supervisors. In other words, we included within our analysis all officers and supervisors from the rank of sergeant and below. Along with regular patrol officers, we included additional units that performed patrol-related duties. When we examined the dispatch data, we noted that these units were responding to calls for service throughout the year. We included additional units assigned to the following details: bike patrols, crime prevention, K-9, prisoner transport, special enforcement, school resource duty, and traffic enforcement.

The department deployed an average of 8.5 and 8.2 regular patrol officers, respectively, during the 24-hour day in February 2009 and August 2009. When including the additional units, the department deployed an average of 12.9 and 12.5 officers, respectively, during the 24-hour day in February 2009 and August 2009. There was only limited variability in deployment by season and between weekends and weekdays. Deployment varied significantly by time of day.

**Figure 11. Deployed Officers, Weekdays, February 2009**





**Figure 12. Deployed Officers, Weekends, February 2009**




## Observations:

- The average patrol deployment was approximately 8.9 officers during the week and 7.5 officers on weekends.
- During the week, deployment reached as high as 14.3 officers between 4 p.m. and 5 p.m. due to two overlapping shifts.
- During the week, deployment dropped as low as 5.5 officers between 6 a.m. and 7 a.m.
- On weekends, deployment reached as high as 11.6 officers between midnight and 1 a.m.
- On weekends, deployment dropped as low as 5.1 officers between 6 a.m. and 7 a.m.
- During the week, additional units (e.g., traffic) added an average of 5.1 officers to the total deployment, reaching a maximum of 23.3 officers between 4 p.m. and 5 p.m.
- From 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. there were always more than 17 officers deployed.
- On weekends, additional units added an average of 2.6 officers to the total deployment, reaching a maximum of 15 officers between midnight and 1 a.m.

**Figure 13. Deployment and Workload, Weekdays, February 2009**




**Figure 14. Deployment and Workload, Weekends, February 2009**




**Observations:**

- During the week, patrol workload averaged 5.3 personnel per hour. This was 38 percent of deployment, meaning that patrol officers spent 38 percent of their time on patrol-related activities.
- During the week, patrol workload dropped as low as 20 percent of deployment between 3 a.m. and 4 a.m. It was as high as 71 percent of deployment between 5 a.m. and 6 a.m. This relatively high percentage was mainly due to police-initiated calls.
- On weekends, patrol workload averaged 5.2 personnel per hour, which was 51 percent of deployment.
- On weekends, patrol workload dropped as low as 26 percent of deployment between 8 a.m. and 9 a.m. and rose as high as 92 percent of deployment between 9 p.m. and 10 p.m.

**Figure 15. Deployed Officers, Weekdays, August 2009**




**Figure 16. Deployed Officers, Weekends, August 2009**




## Observations:

- The number of officers deployed was slightly lower in August than in February.
- There was an average of 8.5 officers deployed during the week and 7.4 officers on weekends in August.
- Basic deployment rose as high as 13.3 officers between 4 p.m. and 5 p.m. and dropped as low as 5.6 officers between 6 a.m. and 7 a.m. on weekdays.
- Basic deployment rose as high 13.1 officers between midnight and 1 a.m. and dropped as low as 5.3 officers between 1 p.m. and 4 p.m. on weekends.
- When additional units (e.g., traffic) were added, the deployment during the week rose as in February.
- Total deployment reached a maximum of 20.4 officers at 4:30 p.m. during the week and 15.8 officers at midnight on weekends. From noon to 5 p.m. on weekdays, there were always more than 17 officers deployed.

**Figure 17. Deployment and Workload, Weekdays, August 2009**




**Figure 18. Deployment and Workload, Weekends, August 2009**




## Observations:

- During the week, patrol workload averaged 5.1 personnel per hour. This was 38 percent of total deployment, meaning that patrol officers spent 38 percent of their time on patrol-related activities.
- During the week, patrol workload dropped as low as 20 percent of total deployment between 3 a.m. and 4 a.m. and rose as high as 81 percent of total deployment between 6 a.m. and 7 a.m. This relatively high percentage was mainly due to police-initiated calls.
- On weekends, average workload was 4.3 personnel per hour, which was 44 percent of total deployment.
- On weekends, patrol workload dropped as low as 25 percent of total deployment between 8 p.m. and 9 p.m. and rose as high as 76 percent of total deployment between 9 p.m. and 10 p.m. This relatively high percentage was mainly due to police-initiated calls.


**Figure 19. Out-of-Service Workload, Weekdays, February 2009**




**Figure 20. Out-of-Service Workload, Weekends, February 2009**



**Figure 21. Out-of-Service Workload, Weekdays, August 2009**



**Figure 22. Out-of-Service Workload, Weekends, August 2009**



## Observations:

- Out-of-service workload varied between 0.1 and 8.5 personnel per hour.
- During the week in February, out-of-service workload averaged 2.5 personnel per hour and varied between 0.7 and 8.5 personnel per hour, with the maximum occurring between 8 a.m. and 9 a.m.
- On weekends in February, out-of-service workload averaged 1.1 personnel per hour and varied between 0.1 and 2.6 personnel per hour, with the maximum occurring between 10 p.m. and 11 p.m.
- In February, total workload (out-of-service and patrol) during the week averaged 12.5 personnel per hour, which was 56 percent of deployment.
- In February, total workload on weekends averaged 8.5 personnel per hour, which was 62 percent of deployment.
- During the week in August, out-of-service workload averaged 2.1 personnel per hour and varied between 0.5 and 4.6 personnel per hour, with the maximum occurring between 8 a.m. and 9 a.m.
- On weekends in August, out-of-service workload averaged 1.1 personnel per hour and varied between 0.4 and 2.1 personnel per hour, with the maximum occurring between 10 p.m. and 11 p.m.
- In August, total workload (out-of-service and patrol) during the week averaged 11.6 personnel per hour, which was 53 percent of deployment.
- In August, total workload on weekends averaged 7.3 personnel per hour, which was 56 percent of deployment.

## **D. Response Times**

We analyzed the response times to various types of calls, separating the elapsed time into dispatch and travel times. We begin the discussion with statistics that include all calls combined. We analyzed several types of calls to determine whether response times varied by call type. To better understand the response-time issue, the study team calculated the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of response time for three types of calls. We calculated the dispatch delay, travel time, and the total response time.

Before presenting the specific figures and tables, we summarize all of the observations. We started with 7,870 calls for February 2009 and 7,389 calls for August 2009. We were interested in examining only police response to actual calls from citizens. For this reason, we excluded out-of-service records and officer-initiated calls. We also removed calls with zero time on scene in order to separate false alarms and similar types of calls. We encountered some calls without recorded arrival times. We excluded these from our analysis. This left 1,981 calls in February 2009 and 1,842 calls in August 2009. As both samples exceed 1,000 calls per month, we believe the analysis is quite reliable.


Our initial analysis does not distinguish calls based on their priority. It does examine the difference in response by time of day and compares summer and winter periods. After the overall statistics, we present an analysis based on the priority codes provided within the data. We focus on high-priority calls for the entire year. The response times for these were significantly shorter.

*Response time* is measured as the difference between when a call is received and when the first unit arrives on scene. This is separated into dispatch delay and travel time.

*Dispatch delay* is the time from when a call is received until a unit is dispatched.

*Travel time* is the time from when the first unit is dispatched until the first unit arrives.

**Figure 23. Average Response Time, by Hour of Day, February and August 2009**




**Observations:**

- Average response times varied significantly by hour of day.
- The overall average was slightly higher in February than in August.
- In February, the longest response times were between 11 a.m. and noon, with an average of 18.3 minutes.
- In February, the shortest response times were between 4 a.m. and 5 a.m., with an average of 6.8 minutes.
- In August, the longest response times were between 4 p.m. and 5 p.m., with an average of 23.0 minutes.
- In August, the shortest response times were between 3 a.m. and 4 a.m., with an average of 7.2 minutes.


### Reading the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) Chart

The vertical axis is the probability or percentage of calls. The horizontal axis is time of dispatch delay, travel time, or total response time. For example, approximately 80 percent of the calls in August experienced a dispatch delay of fourteen minutes or less. (The 80-percent line intersects the curve at the fourteen-minute mark.)


**Figure 24. Dispatch Delay Cumulative Distribution Function**




**Figure 25. Travel Time Cumulative Distribution Function**




**Figure 26. Response Time Cumulative Distribution Function**



**Figure 27. Average Response Times in February 2009, by Category**



**Figure 28. Average Response Times in August 2009, by Category**



**Table 11. Average Response Time Components, by Category**

Category	February 2009			August 2009		
	Dispatch	Travel	Response	Dispatch	Travel	Response
Agency assist	5.7	6.9	12.6	10.5	6.3	16.9
Arrest	11.1	5.7	16.8	14.9	10.7	25.6
Crime	11.7	6.0	17.7	11.1	6.5	17.5
<i>Directed patrol</i>	<i>30.0</i>	<i>5.0</i>	<i>35.0</i>	<i>17.8</i>	<i>21.6</i>	<i>21.6</i>
General	12.2	6.4	18.6	11.0	16.9	16.9
Investigations	9.8	5.6	15.4	9.0	14.2	14.2
Juvenile	10.8	5.7	16.5	5.7	11.7	11.7
Suspicious	7.2	5.0	12.2	6.5	11.4	11.4
Traffic	5.7	5.4	11.1	4.7	9.7	9.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>9.2</b>	<b>5.6</b>	<b>14.9</b>	<b>8.7</b>	<b>5.6</b>	<b>14.2</b>

**Table 12. 90th Percentiles for Components, by Category**

Category	February 2009			August 2009		
	Dispatch	Travel	Response	Dispatch	Travel	Response
Agency assist	14.2	13.0	27.2	71.4	13.0	81.2
Arrest	32.8	13.4	38.2	51.4	27.9	67.7
Crime	29.6	12.0	38.0	35.8	12.0	44.0
<i>Directed patrol</i>	<i>96.0</i>	<i>15.0</i>	<i>96.0</i>	<i>36.0</i>	<i>8.0</i>	<i>38.0</i>
General	40.8	12.0	50.8	34.0	11.0	37.0
Investigations	28.0	11.0	36.0	23.0	11.0	31.0
Juvenile	37.1	11.0	42.5	15.6	11.0	24.4
Suspicious	21.9	10.0	29.0	19.0	10.0	27.0
Traffic	14.8	9.8	26.6	13.0	9.0	23.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>26.0</b>	<b>11.0</b>	<b>34.8</b>	<b>25.0</b>	<b>11.0</b>	<b>33.0</b>

**Table 13. Sample Sizes by Category**

<b>Category</b>	<b>February 2009</b>	<b>August 2009</b>
Agency assist	68	57
Arrest	15	20
Crime	443	481
<i>Directed patrol</i>	4	5
General	143	114
Investigations	479	425
Juvenile	88	53
Suspicious	580	559
Traffic	161	128
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,981</b>	<b>1,842</b>

Observations:

- Response times varied significantly by call category.
- In August, average response times were as short as 9.7 minutes (for traffic-related incidents) and as long as 25.6 minutes (for arrests).
- In February, average response times were as short as 11.1 minutes (for traffic) and as long as 18.6 minutes for general noncriminal calls.
- Average response times for crimes were between 17 and 18 minutes for both months.
- In August, average dispatch delays varied between 4.7 minutes (for traffic) and 14.9 minutes (for arrests).
- In February, average dispatch delays varied between 5.7 minutes (for traffic and agency assists) and 12.2 minutes for general noncriminal calls.
- In August, 90th percentile values for response times were as short as 23.3 minutes (for traffic) and as long as 81.2 minutes (for agency assists).
- In February, 90th percentile values for response times were as short as 26.6 minutes (for traffic) and as long as 96.0 minutes (for directed patrol).


### *High-Priority Calls*

A priority code from 1 through 3 is assigned to each call by the dispatch center. Table 14 shows average response times by priority. A separate category for accidents with injuries is also included. These averages include nonzero-on-scene other-initiated in-service calls throughout the year from September 2008 to July 2009. There were a total of approximately 26,000 calls with valid response times.

**Table 14. Average Dispatch, Travel, and Response Times, by Priority**

<b>Priority</b>	<b>Dispatch</b>	<b>Travel</b>	<b>Response</b>	<b>Total calls</b>
1	1.2	3.6	4.8	2,817
2	9.2	5.7	14.8	14,447
3	13.8	6.4	19.8	8,494
<b>Total</b>	<b>9.9</b>	<b>5.7</b>	<b>15.4</b>	<b>25,758</b>
Accidents with injury	1.4	3.6	5.0	193

**Figure 29. Average Response Times for High-Priority Calls, by Hour**



**Observations:**

- High-priority calls (priority 1) and accidents with injuries had much shorter response times – 4.8 and 5.0 minutes, respectively – compared with the overall yearly average of 15.4 minutes.
- Average response time for high-priority calls varied by time of day, from approximately 3.7 minutes between midnight and 2 a.m. to about 6.1 minutes between 7 a.m. and 8 a.m.
- Average dispatch delays were consistently less than 2 minutes.
- Hourly samples for injury accidents were small. With only about 200 accidents, we have about 8 incidents for each of our hourly samples. For this reason, hourly averages for accidents were omitted from Figure 29.

## **Appendix A: Crime Information**

### Offenses Known to Law Enforcement by City, Arizona 2009

City	Pop.	Violent crime	Murder and nonnegligent manslaughter	Forcible rape	Robbery	Aggravated assault	Property crime	Burglary	Larceny-theft	Motor vehicle theft	Arson
Apache Junction	32,869	104	0	8	15	81	1,200	296	780	124	11
Avondale	88,773	351	5	23	111	212	4,389	1,012	2,831	546	18
Bisbee	5,965	66	0	0	0	66	208	32	176	0	0
Buckeye	56,780	69	1	6	15	47	1,268	361	794	113	3
Bullhead City	41,721	65	1	1	27	36	1,577	324	1,166	87	10
Camp Verde	11,012	23	0	1	0	22	243	47	178	18	3
Casa Grande	43,254	254	4	6	60	184	2,806	677	1,901	228	19
Chandler	256,091	740	5	46	205	484	7,458	1,376	5,599	483	62
Clarkdale	4,374	9	0	0	0	9	54	24	28	2	0
Clifton	2,438	8	0	0	0	8	48	25	19	4	0
Colorado City	4,934	3	0	0	0	3	14	4	10	0	0
Coolidge	10,540	61	2	3	10	46	548	136	365	47	12
Cottonwood	11,664	42	0	1	4	37	375	45	312	18	4
Douglas	17,622	41	0	5	8	28	593	81	457	55	0
Eagar	4,541	8	0	0	0	8	81	19	57	5	0
El Mirage	28,196	87	0	4	24	59	919	226	621	72	12
Eloy	13,049	106	0	21	15	70	590	217	328	45	19
Flagstaff	61,072	282	4	43	53	182	3,118	303	2,725	90	17
Florence	21,229	28	0	1	4	23	266	72	174	20	0
Fredonia	1,135	1	0	0	0	1	6	2	4	0	0
Gilbert	231,799	194	4	22	59	109	4,571	1,010	3,337	224	28
Glendale	255,080	1,147	18	54	420	655	12,489	2,551	8,214	1,724	82
Goodyear	67,390	134	0	14	28	92	2,079	952	842	285	18

City	Pop.	Violent crime	Murder and nonnegligent manslaughter	Forcible rape	Robbery	Aggravated assault	Property crime	Burglary	Larceny-theft	Motor vehicle theft	Arson
Holbrook	5,094	4	1	0	3	0	381	106	254	21	0
Huachuca City	1,988	4	0	0	0	4	35	9	20	6	1
Jerome	356	2	0	0	0	2	31	10	21	0	0
Kingman	28,700	90	3	10	12	65	1,799	347	1,348	104	5
Lake Havasu City	58,406	106	3	19	12	72	1,362	323	955	84	5
Mammoth	2,682	6	0	0	0	6	38	15	20	3	1
Marana	38,028	46	0	4	22	20	1,011	141	781	89	7
Maricopa	52,200	52	0	9	4	39	896	195	638	63	1
Mesa	470,833	2,000	14	123	611	1,252	16,079	3,076	11,700	1,303	85
Miami	1,762	27	0	3	1	23	71	30	38	3	5
Nogales	19,433	69	0	1	8	60	720	139	456	125	0
Oro Valley	44,854	21	0	2	3	16	691	122	536	33	4
Paradise Valley	15,141	14	0	1	7	6	327	227	85	15	0
Parker	3,180	22	0	0	3	19	244	57	168	19	1
Peoria	164,366	321	8	53	89	171	4,872	1,120	3,303	449	8
Phoenix	1,597,397	8,730	122	522	3,757	4,329	65,617	16,281	39,643	9,693	436
Pima	2,173	7	0	1	0	6	78	26	47	5	0
Pinetop-Lakeside	4,654	26	1	0	1	24	226	62	158	6	3
Prescott	43,748	147	2	8	27	110	1,238	266	941	31	8
Prescott Valley	40,539	127	0	7	10	110	692	159	509	24	4
Quartzsite	3,497	1	0	0	0	1	71	1	67	3	1
Safford <sup>1</sup>	9,894		0	2	4		569	167	382	20	5

City	Pop.	Violent crime	Murder and nonnegligent manslaughter	Forcible rape	Robbery	Aggravated assault	Property crime	Burglary	Larceny-theft	Motor vehicle theft	Arson
Sahuarita	28,201	14	0	2	2	10	333	53	257	23	1
Scottsdale	239,115	410	10	19	129	252	6,798	1,337	5,155	306	31
Sedona	11,759	27	0	6	1	20	246	65	177	4	2
Show Low	12,929	99	3	4	1	91	451	131	305	15	2
Sierra Vista	43,956	111	1	13	23	74	1,397	174	1,159	64	8
Snowflake-Taylor	10,084	39	0	0	1	38	186	58	109	19	2
Somerton	13,041	19	1	0	2	16	208	43	135	30	4
South Tucson	6,071	178	2	8	83	85	921	116	736	69	0
Springerville	1,994	12	0	1	0	11	34	5	28	1	0
Surprise	104,692	111	1	9	37	64	2,405	532	1,706	167	24
Tempe	177,486	922	2	66	306	548	8,986	1,478	6,692	816	68
Thatcher	5,122	0	0	0	0	0	105	19	85	1	0
Toileson	7,498	47	0	5	10	32	808	210	535	63	1
Tombstone	1,573	12	0	2	0	10	76	20	50	6	0
Tucson <sup>1</sup>	547,981	3,560	35	204	1,246	2,075		5,062		3,564	225
Wellton	1,916	1	0	0	1	0	20	6	11	3	0
Wickenburg	6,707	17	0	4	0	13	156	33	102	21	0
Willcox	3,807	9	0	0	1	8	222	40	174	8	1
Williams	3,361	20	0	1	1	18	140	25	114	1	1
Winslow	9,903	103	1	3	17	82	619	73	525	21	2
Youngtown	5,177	11	1	0	2	8	101	28	55	18	1
Yuma	91,433	570	2	24	86	458	3,471	1,082	2,075	314	32

<sup>1</sup> The FBI determined that the agency did not follow national Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program guidelines for reporting an offense. Consequently, this figure is not included in this table.

### Crime and Officer Data by City 2009

City	Population	Total Officers	Officers per 10000 Pop.	Violent crime	VC Rate	Murder and nonnegligent manslaughter	Murder Rate
South Tucson	6,071	12	19.77	178	293.20	2	3.29
Miami	1,762	7	39.73	27	153.23	0	0.00
Bisbee	5,965	13	21.79	66	110.65	0	0.00
Winslow	9,903	26	26.25	103	104.01	1	1.01
Eloy	13,049	28	21.46	106	81.23	0	0.00
Show Low	12,929	29	22.43	99	76.57	3	2.32
Parker	3,180	12	37.74	22	69.18	0	0.00
Tucson <sup>1</sup>	547,981	1,012	18.47	3,560	64.97	35	0.64
Tolleson	7,498	31	41.34	47	62.68	0	0.00
Yuma	91,433	153	16.73	570	62.34	2	0.22
Springerville	1,994	7	35.11	12	60.18	0	0.00
Williams	3,361	12	35.70	20	59.51	0	0.00
Casa Grande	43,254	74	17.11	254	58.72	4	0.92
Coolidge	10,540	32	30.36	61	57.87	2	1.90
Jerome	356	5	140.45	2	56.18	0	0.00
Pinetop-Lakeside	4,654	15	32.23	26	55.87	1	2.15
Phoenix	1,597,397	3,279	20.53	8,730	54.65	122	0.76
Tempe	177,486	356	20.06	922	51.95	2	0.11
Flagstaff	61,072	110	18.01	282	46.18	4	0.65
Glendale	255,080	419	16.43	1,147	44.97	18	0.71
Mesa	470,833	801	17.01	2,000	42.48	14	0.30
Avondale	88,773	102	11.49	351	39.54	5	0.56
Snowflake-Taylor	10,084	13	12.89	39	38.68	0	0.00
Cottonwood	11,664	32	27.43	42	36.01	0	0.00

City	Population	Total Officers	Officers per 10000 Pop.	Violent crime	VC Rate	Murder and nonnegligent manslaughter	Murder Rate
Nogales	19,433	65	33.45	69	35.51	0	0.00
Prescott	43,748	69	15.77	147	33.60	2	0.46
Clifton	2,438	5	20.51	8	32.81	0	0.00
Pima	2,173	4	18.41	7	32.21	0	0.00
Apache Junction	32,869	51	15.52	104	31.64	0	0.00
Kingman	28,700	55	19.16	90	31.36	3	1.05
Prescott Valley	40,539	62	15.29	127	31.33	0	0.00
El Mirage	28,196	45	15.96	87	30.86	0	0.00
Chandler	256,091	329	12.85	740	28.90	5	0.20
Wickenburg	6,707	14	20.87	17	25.35	0	0.00
Sierra Vista	43,956	68	15.47	111	25.25	1	0.23
Willcox	3,807	11	28.89	9	23.64	0	0.00
Douglas	17,622	35	19.86	41	23.27	0	0.00
Sedona	11,759	30	25.51	27	22.96	0	0.00
Mammoth	2,682	3	11.19	6	22.37	0	0.00
Youngtown	5,177	14	27.04	11	21.25	1	1.93
Camp Verde	11,012	22	19.98	23	20.89	0	0.00
Clarkdale	4,374	9	20.58	9	20.58	0	0.00
Huachuca City	1,988	4	20.12	4	20.12	0	0.00
Goodyear	67,390	95	14.10	134	19.88	0	0.00
Peoria	164,366	184	11.19	321	19.53	8	0.49
Lake Havasu City	58,406	88	15.07	106	18.15	3	0.51
Eagar	4,541	8	17.62	8	17.62	0	0.00
Scottsdale	239,115	426	17.82	410	17.15	10	0.42
Bullhead City	41,721	79	18.94	65	15.58	1	0.24
Somerton	13,041	23	17.64	19	14.57	1	0.77

City	Population	Total Officers	Officers per 10000 Pop.	Violent crime	VC Rate	Murder and nonnegligent manslaughter	Murder Rate
Florence	21,229	30	14.13	28	13.19	0	0.00
Buckeye	56,780	68	11.98	69	12.15	1	0.18
Marana	38,028	78	20.51	46	12.10	0	0.00
Surprise	104,692	126	12.04	111	10.60	1	0.10
Maricopa	52,200	56	10.73	52	9.96	0	0.00
Paradise Valley	15,141	29	19.15	14	9.25	0	0.00
Fredonia	1,135	4	35.24	1	8.81	0	0.00
Gilbert	231,799	225	9.71	194	8.37	4	0.17
Holbrook	5,094	15	29.45	4	7.85	1	1.96
Colorado City	4,934	6	12.16	3	6.08	0	0.00
Wellton	1,916	6	31.32	1	5.22	0	0.00
Sahuarita	28,201	43	15.25	14	4.96	0	0.00
Oro Valley	44,854	100	22.29	21	4.68	0	0.00
Quartzsite	3,497	13	37.17	1	2.86	0	0.00
Safford <sup>1</sup>	9,894	20	20.21		0.00	0	0.00
Thatcher	5,122	11	21.48	0	0.00	0	0.00

City	Forcible rape	Rape Rate	Robbery	Robbery Rate	Aggravated assault	Assault Rate
South Tucson	8	13.18	83	136.72	85	140.01
Miami	3	17.03	1	5.68	23	130.53
Bisbee	0	0.00	0	0.00	66	110.65
Winslow	3	3.03	17	17.17	82	82.80
Eloy	21	16.09	15	11.50	70	53.64
Show Low	4	3.09	1	0.77	91	70.38
Parker	0	0.00	3	9.43	19	59.75
Tucson	204	3.72	1,246	22.74	2,075	37.87
Tolleson	5	6.67	10	13.34	32	42.68
Yuma	24	2.62	86	9.41	458	50.09
Springerville	1	5.02	0	0.00	11	55.17
Williams	1	2.98	1	2.98	18	53.56
Casa Grande	6	1.39	60	13.87	184	42.54
Coolidge	3	2.85	10	9.49	46	43.64
Jerome	0	0.00	0	0.00	2	56.18
Pinetop-Lakeside	0	0.00	1	2.15	24	51.57
Phoenix	522	3.27	3,757	23.52	4,329	27.10
Tempe	66	3.72	306	17.24	548	30.88
Flagstaff	43	7.04	53	8.68	182	29.80
Glendale	54	2.12	420	16.47	655	25.68
Mesa	123	2.61	611	12.98	1,252	26.59
Avondale	23	2.59	111	12.50	212	23.88
Snowflake-Taylor	0	0.00	1	0.99	38	37.68
Cottonwood	1	0.86	4	3.43	37	31.72

City	Forcible rape	Rape Rate	Robbery	Robbery Rate	Aggravated assault	Assault Rate
Nogales	1	0.51	8	4.12	60	30.88
Prescott	8	1.83	27	6.17	110	25.14
Clifton	0	0.00	0	0.00	8	32.81
Pima	1	4.60	0	0.00	6	27.61
Apache Junction	8	2.43	15	4.56	81	24.64
Kingman	10	3.48	12	4.18	65	22.65
Prescott Valley	7	1.73	10	2.47	110	27.13
El Mirage	4	1.42	24	8.51	59	20.92
Chandler	46	1.80	205	8.00	484	18.90
Wickenburg	4	5.96	0	0.00	13	19.38
Sierra Vista	13	2.96	23	5.23	74	16.84
Willcox	0	0.00	1	2.63	8	21.01
Douglas	5	2.84	8	4.54	28	15.89
Sedona	6	5.10	1	0.85	20	17.01
Mammoth	0	0.00	0	0.00	6	22.37
Youngtown	0	0.00	2	3.86	8	15.45
Camp Verde	1	0.91	0	0.00	22	19.98
Clarkdale	0	0.00	0	0.00	9	20.58
Huachuca City	0	0.00	0	0.00	4	20.12
Goodyear	14	2.08	28	4.15	92	13.65
Peoria	53	3.22	89	5.41	171	10.40
Lake Havasu City	19	3.25	12	2.05	72	12.33
Eagar	0	0.00	0	0.00	8	17.62
Scottsdale	19	0.79	129	5.39	252	10.54
Bullhead City	1	0.24	27	6.47	36	8.63
Somerton	0	0.00	2	1.53	16	12.27

City	Forcible rape	Rape Rate	Robbery	Robbery Rate	Aggravated assault	Assault Rate
Florence	1	0.47	4	1.88	23	10.83
Buckeye	6	1.06	15	2.64	47	8.28
Marana	4	1.05	22	5.79	20	5.26
Surprise	9	0.86	37	3.53	64	6.11
Maricopa	9	1.72	4	0.77	39	7.47
Paradise Valley	1	0.66	7	4.62	6	3.96
Fredonia	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	8.81
Gilbert	22	0.95	59	2.55	109	4.70
Holbrook	0	0.00	3	5.89	0	0.00
Colorado City	0	0.00	0	0.00	3	6.08
Wellton	0	0.00	1	5.22	0	0.00
Sahuarita	2	0.71	2	0.71	10	3.55
Oro Valley	2	0.45	3	0.67	16	3.57
Quartzsite	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	2.86
Safford <sup>1</sup>	2	2.02	4	4.04		0.00
Thatcher	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00

City	Property crime	PC Rate	Burglary	Burg. Rate	Larceny -theft	Larceny Rate	Motor vehicle theft	MV Rate	Arson	Arson Rate
South Tucson	921	1,517.05	116	191.07	736	1,212.32	69	113.66	0	0.00
Miami	71	402.95	30	170.26	38	215.66	3	17.03	5	28.38
Bisbee	208	348.70	32	53.65	176	295.05	0	0.00	0	0.00
Winslow	619	625.06	73	73.72	525	530.14	21	21.21	2	2.02
Eloy	590	452.14	217	166.30	328	251.36	45	34.49	19	14.56
Show Low	451	348.83	131	101.32	305	235.90	15	11.60	2	1.55
Parker	244	767.30	57	179.25	168	528.30	19	59.75	1	3.14
Tucson <sup>1</sup>		0.00	5,062	92.38		0.00	3,564	65.04	225	4.11
Tolleson	808	1,077.62	210	280.07	535	713.52	63	84.02	1	1.33
Yuma	3,471	379.62	1,082	118.34	2,075	226.94	314	34.34	32	3.50
Springerville	34	170.51	5	25.08	28	140.42	1	5.02	0	0.00
Williams	140	416.54	25	74.38	114	339.18	1	2.98	1	2.98
Casa Grande	2,806	648.73	677	156.52	1,901	439.50	228	52.71	19	4.39
Coolidge	548	519.92	136	129.03	365	346.30	47	44.59	12	11.39
Jerome	31	870.79	10	280.90	21	589.89	0	0.00	0	0.00
Pinetop-Lakeside	226	485.60	62	133.22	158	339.49	6	12.89	3	6.45
Phoenix	65,617	410.77	16,281	101.92	39,643	248.17	9,693	60.68	436	2.73
Tempe	8,986	506.29	1,478	83.27	6,692	377.04	816	45.98	68	3.83
Flagstaff	3,118	510.54	303	49.61	2,725	446.19	90	14.74	17	2.78
Glendale	12,489	489.61	2,551	100.01	8,214	322.02	1,724	67.59	82	3.21
Mesa	16,079	341.50	3,076	65.33	11,700	248.50	1,303	27.67	85	1.81
Avondale	4,389	494.41	1,012	114.00	2,831	318.90	546	61.51	18	2.03
Snowflake-Taylor	186	184.45	58	57.52	109	108.09	19	18.84	2	1.98
Cottonwood	375	321.50	45	38.58	312	267.49	18	15.43	4	3.43

City	Property crime	PC Rate	Burglary	Burg. Rate	Larceny-theft	Larceny Rate	Motor vehicle theft	MV Rate	Arson	Arson Rate
Nogales	720	370.50	139	71.53	456	234.65	125	64.32	0	0.00
Prescott	1,238	282.98	266	60.80	941	215.10	31	7.09	8	1.83
Clifton	48	196.88	25	102.54	19	77.93	4	16.41	0	0.00
Pima	78	358.95	26	119.65	47	216.29	5	23.01	0	0.00
Apache Junction	1,200	365.09	296	90.05	780	237.31	124	37.73	11	3.35
Kingman	1,799	626.83	347	120.91	1,348	469.69	104	36.24	5	1.74
Prescott Valley	692	170.70	159	39.22	509	125.56	24	5.92	4	0.99
El Mirage	919	325.93	226	80.15	621	220.24	72	25.54	12	4.26
Chandler	7,458	291.22	1,376	53.73	5,599	218.63	483	18.86	62	2.42
Wickenburg	156	232.59	33	49.20	102	152.08	21	31.31	0	0.00
Sierra Vista	1,397	317.82	174	39.59	1,159	263.67	64	14.56	8	1.82
Willcox	222	583.14	40	105.07	174	457.05	8	21.01	1	2.63
Douglas	593	336.51	81	45.97	457	259.33	55	31.21	0	0.00
Sedona	246	209.20	65	55.28	177	150.52	4	3.40	2	1.70
Mammoth	38	141.69	15	55.93	20	74.57	3	11.19	1	3.73
Youngtown	101	195.09	28	54.09	55	106.24	18	34.77	1	1.93
Camp Verde	243	220.67	47	42.68	178	161.64	18	16.35	3	2.72
Clarkdale	54	123.46	24	54.87	28	64.01	2	4.57	0	0.00
Huachuca City	35	176.06	9	45.27	20	100.60	6	30.18	1	5.03
Goodyear	2,079	308.50	952	141.27	842	124.94	285	42.29	18	2.67
Peoria	4,872	296.41	1,120	68.14	3,303	200.95	449	27.32	8	0.49
Lake Havasu City	1,362	233.20	323	55.30	955	163.51	84	14.38	5	0.86
Eagar	81	178.37	19	41.84	57	125.52	5	11.01	0	0.00
Scottsdale	6,798	284.30	1,337	55.91	5,155	215.59	306	12.80	31	1.30
Bullhead City	1,577	377.99	324	77.66	1,166	279.48	87	20.85	10	2.40
Somerton	208	159.50	43	32.97	135	103.52	30	23.00	4	3.07

City	Property crime	PC Rate	Burglary	Burg. Rate	Larceny-theft	Larceny Rate	Motor vehicle theft	MV Rate	Arson	Arson Rate
Florence	266	125.30	72	33.92	174	81.96	20	9.42	0	0.00
Buckeye	1,268	223.32	361	63.58	794	139.84	113	19.90	3	0.53
Marana	1,011	265.86	141	37.08	781	205.37	89	23.40	7	1.84
Surprise	2,405	229.72	532	50.82	1,706	162.95	167	15.95	24	2.29
Maricopa	896	171.65	195	37.36	638	122.22	63	12.07	1	0.19
Paradise Valley	327	215.97	227	149.92	85	56.14	15	9.91	0	0.00
Fredonia	6	52.86	2	17.62	4	35.24	0	0.00	0	0.00
Gilbert	4,571	197.20	1,010	43.57	3,337	143.96	224	9.66	28	1.21
Holbrook	381	747.94	106	208.09	254	498.63	21	41.22	0	0.00
Colorado City	14	28.37	4	8.11	10	20.27	0	0.00	0	0.00
Wellton	20	104.38	6	31.32	11	57.41	3	15.66	0	0.00
Sahuarita	333	118.08	53	18.79	257	91.13	23	8.16	1	0.35
Oro Valley	691	154.06	122	27.20	536	119.50	33	7.36	4	0.89
Quartzsite	71	203.03	1	2.86	67	191.59	3	8.58	1	2.86
Safford	569	575.10	167	168.79	382	386.09	20	20.21	5	5.05
Thatcher	105	205.00	19	37.09	85	165.95	1	1.95	0	0.00

**Crime Rates in Arizona Cities with a Population Greater Than 40,000**

Location	Population	Officer per 100000 Pop.	Violent crime	VC Rate	Murder	Murder Rate	Forcible rape	Rape Rate	Robbery	Robbery Rate	Agg. assault	Assault Rate
US	307,006,550	230.25	1,318,398	429.44	15241	4.96	88097	28.70	408,217	132.97	806,843	262.81
AZ	6,595,778	139.60	26,929	408.28	354	5.37	2110	31.99	8099	122.79	16366	248.13
Maricopa	52,200	107.28	52	99.62	0	0.00	9	17.24	4	7.66	39	74.71
Oro Valley	44,854	222.95	21	46.82	0	0.00	2	4.46	3	6.69	16	35.67
Sierra Vista	43,956	154.70	111	252.53	1	2.28	13	29.58	23	52.33	74	168.35
Prescott	43,748	157.72	147	336.02	2	4.57	8	18.29	27	61.72	110	251.44
Casa Grande	43,254	171.08	254	587.23	4	9.25	6	13.87	60	138.72	184	425.39
Bullhead City	41,721	189.35	65	155.80	1	2.40	1	2.40	27	64.72	36	86.29
Prescott Valley	40,539	152.94	127	313.28	0	0.00	7	17.27	10	24.67	110	271.34
Marana	38,028	205.11	46	120.96	0	0.00	4	10.52	22	57.85	20	52.59

Location	Property crime	PC Rate	Burglary	Burglary Rate	Larceny-theft	Larceny Rate	Motor vehicle theft	MV Rate
US	9,320,971	3,036.08	2,199,125	716.31	6,327,230	2,060.94	794,616	258.83
AZ	234,582	3,556.55	53,412	809.79	155,184	2,352.78	25,986	393.98
Maricopa	896	1,716.48	195	373.56	638	1,222.22	63	120.69
Oro Valley	691	1,540.55	122	271.99	536	1,194.99	33	73.57
Sierra Vista	1,397	3,178.18	174	395.85	1,159	2,636.73	64	145.60
Prescott	1,238	2,829.84	266	608.03	941	2,150.96	31	70.86
Casa Grande	2,806	6,487.26	677	1,565.17	1,901	4,394.97	228	527.12
Bullhead City	1,577	3,779.87	324	776.59	1,166	2,794.76	87	208.53
Prescott Valley	692	1,707.00	159	392.21	509	1,255.58	24	59.20
Marana	1,011	2,658.57	141	370.78	781	2,053.75	89	234.04

## Full-Time Law Enforcement Employees by City in Arizona, 2009

City	Population	Total law enforcement employees	Total officers	Total civilians
Apache Junction	32,869	85	51	34
Avondale	88,773	155	102	53
Benson	4,863	23	14	9
Bisbee	5,965	20	13	7
Buckeye	56,780	89	68	21
Bullhead City	41,721	126	79	47
Camp Verde	11,012	34	22	12
Casa Grande	43,254	109	74	35
Chandler	256,091	493	329	164
Chino Valley	11,453	37	28	9
Clarkdale	4,374	11	9	2
Clifton	2,438	9	5	4
Colorado City	4,934	10	6	4
Coolidge	10,540	43	32	11
Cottonwood	11,664	48	32	16
Douglas	17,622	49	35	14
Eagar	4,541	10	8	2
El Mirage	28,196	52	45	7
Eloy	13,049	40	28	12
Flagstaff	61,072	159	110	49
Florence	21,229	44	30	14
Fredonia	1,135	4	4	0
Gilbert	231,799	340	225	115
Glendale	255,080	569	419	150
Globe	7,167	32	24	8
Goodyear	67,390	130	95	35
Hayden	1,234	9	8	1
Holbrook	5,094	22	15	7
Huachuca City	1,988	9	4	5
Jerome	356	5	5	0
Kearny	3,438	9	6	3
Kingman	28,700	81	55	26
Lake Havasu City	58,406	117	88	29
Mammoth	2,682	6	3	3
Marana	38,028	107	78	29

City	Population	Total law enforcement employees	Total officers	Total civilians
Maricopa	52,200	63	56	7
Mesa	470,833	1,256	801	455
Miami	1,762	11	7	4
Nogales	19,433	84	65	19
Oro Valley	44,854	126	100	26
Page	6,940	29	20	9
Paradise Valley	15,141	38	29	9
Parker	3,180	14	12	2
Patagonia	768	3	3	0
Payson	15,701	45	29	16
Peoria	164,366	287	184	103
Phoenix	1,597,397	4,360	3,279	1,081
Pima	2,173	4	4	0
Pinetop-Lakeside	4,654	23	15	8
Prescott	43,748	88	69	19
Prescott Valley	40,539	78	62	16
Quartzsite	3,497	14	13	1
Safford	9,894	24	20	4
Sahuarita	28,201	50	43	7
San Luis	26,222	48	31	17
Scottsdale	239,115	682	426	256
Sedona	11,759	40	30	10
Show Low	12,929	42	29	13
Sierra Vista	43,956	97	68	29
Snowflake-Taylor	10,084	22	13	9
Somerton	13,041	32	23	9
South Tucson	6,071	16	12	4
Springerville	1,994	10	7	3
St. Johns	3,613	14	11	3
Superior	3,346	12	9	3
Surprise	104,692	176	126	50
Tempe	177,486	546	356	190
Thatcher	5,122	12	11	1
Tolleson	7,498	40	31	9
Tucson	547,981	1,365	1,012	353
Wellton	1,916	6	6	0

<b>City</b>	<b>Population</b>	<b>Total law enforcement employees</b>	<b>Total officers</b>	<b>Total civilians</b>
Wickenburg	6,707	22	14	8
Willcox	3,807	20	11	9
Williams	3,361	19	12	7
Winslow	9,903	39	26	13
Youngtown	5,177	15	14	1
Yuma	91,433	236	153	83

**Percent of Offenses Cleared by Arrest or Exceptional Means  
by Population Group, 2009**

Population group	Violent crime	Murder and nonnegligent manslaughter	Forcible rape	Robbery	Aggravated assault	Property crime	Burglary	Larceny-theft	Motor vehicle theft	Arson <sup>1</sup>	Number of agencies	2009 estimated population
<b>TOTAL ALL AGENCIES:</b>												
Offenses known	1,142,108	13,242	76,276	352,125	700,465	8,229,516	1,957,825	5,557,560	714,131	53,852	14,274	266,098,836
Percent cleared by arrest	47.1	66.6	41.2	28.2	56.8	18.6	12.5	21.5	12.4	18.5		
Offenses known	86,602	825	6,785	25,676	53,316	800,848	163,900	587,381	49,567	4,515	746	25,666,623
Percent cleared by arrest	48.6	66.8	35.2	31.6	58.2	21.8	12.4	25.2	13.3	19.9		

<sup>1</sup> Not all agencies submit reports for arson to the FBI. As a result, the number of reports the FBI uses to compute the percent of offenses cleared for arson is less than the number it uses to compute the percent of offenses cleared for all other offenses.

<sup>2</sup> Suburban areas include law enforcement agencies in cities with less than 50,000 inhabitants and county law enforcement agencies that are within a Metropolitan Statistical Area. Suburban areas exclude all metropolitan agencies associated with a principal city. The agencies associated with suburban areas also appear in other groups within this table.

## **Appendix B: Casa Grande Police Department Employee Survey**

## Survey Respondents

Age (in years)		
Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
20-29	10.2	5
30-39	51.0	26
40-49	22.	13
50+	16.3	8
Gender		
Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
Male	94.0	50
Female	6.0	3
Rank		
Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
Officer/Corporal	72.0	39
Sergeant	18.0	9
Commander/Chief	10.0	5

### Survey Answers and Rating Average

Answer Options	Strongly Agree	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Rating Average
I believe the Casa Grande Police Department provides an excellent service to the community of Casa Grande.	7	20	18	2	4	1	2.60
My work conditions are acceptable.	3	18	14	10	4	3	3.06
The radios we use are state-of-the-art and work effectively.	0	3	15	11	12	11	4.25
The vehicles we use are appropriate for patrol and investigatory deployment.	7	19	13	3	3	6	2.88
The technology used in general is effective.	0	11	18	10	8	5	3.58
I have adequate supplies/equipment necessary to complete my job.	2	18	15	8	5	4	3.15
I have adequate employee space (lockers, changing rooms, lounge).	3	5	4	11	15	14	4.38
I am satisfied with my work schedule.	14	21	11	2	3	1	2.27
The Department would be better off if the patrol schedule changed to 12 hour tours	6	0	4	6	6	31	4.87
I know what is expected of me and my job.	11	27	6	6	3	0	2.30
I have clear information about how I am to do my job.	6	19	13	9	2	3	2.83
I feel comfortable with what I am asked to do in meeting my job expectations.	7	26	10	6	2	1	2.48
My supervisor and I maintain a clear understanding about what I am expected to do and how I am to carry it out.	8	20	15	2	4	3	2.67
The Command Staff (chiefs and Commanders) does a good job in communicating its decisions to everyone.	0	5	12	5	11	19	4.52
In general, I believe there is good communication between the Department and City Hall.	0	0	7	7	17	21	5.00
The Command Staff (Chiefs and Commanders) listen to my ideas about	0	7	10	5	10	20	4.50



I am proud to be a member of the Casa Grande Police Department .	20	16	10	4	2	1	2.15
I often think of resigning from the Department	5	10	7	4	6	20	4.08
I general, I am satisfied with my career	12	17	12	3	6	1	2.55
Morale is high in the Department	0	2	9	5	15	21	4.85
The Department has a clear sense of its mission	0	7	10	6	15	14	4.37
Patrol Units have plenty of time to interact with the community	0	1	8	7	17	19	4.87
Patrol units have plenty of time to address crime and quality of life issues in between answering calls for service	0	2	4	10	17	19	4.90
There needs to be more officers on patrol to handle the workload	35	12	2	0	0	3	1.60
Whenever I have a concern at work I can always have my concerns resolved	0	5	15	6	12	14	4.29
I would recommend the Casa Grande Police Department to anyone interested in a career in law enforcement.	6	16	7	8	7	8	3.35
The Department is innovative when it comes to fighting crime	0	3	7	11	11	19	4.71
The Department is innovative when it comes to dealing with the community	0	3	16	8	8	17	4.38
Staffing levels are appropriate.	1	0	3	5	12	30	5.29

